What would disengagement mean?

by Glen Rangwala

Commissioned by a group of UK parliamentarians, 22 November 2005

Since April 2003, a major focus of much of the anti-war, anti-imperialist and Iraqi nationalist movements has been the call for the withdrawal of troops from the US-led Coalition from Iraq. Their argument has been that the occupation of Iraq has been illegitimate (and that this occupation continues after the formal handover of power in June 2004), the heavy presence and extensive role of Coalition military personnel has not been conducive to stability and wellbeing in Iraq, and that the Iraqis desire and have a right to freedom from foreign occupation. “End the occupation” has been the main rallying call by these groups.

This call has usually dovetailed with, and has gained added political pungency from, the demand made for the lives of Coalition soldiers to be protected by withdrawing them from Iraq, articulated with increasing frequency by returning military personnel and relatives of those killed or injured whilst serving within Coalition forces in Iraq. Their message of “Bring them home now” (the title of Cindy Sheehan’s tour across the US) has been one that has mobilised populations across the political spectrum in the US, UK and Italy in particular, and has been taken up by the anti-war and anti-imperialist campaigns in those countries.

There have been some who have held to the second standpoint without endorsing the first – that is, that despite the beneficial role of Coalition forces in Iraq they should be withdrawn since the wellbeing of Coalition personnel and not Iraqis should be the priority concern for the Coalition governments. This is in effect the position of the Liberal Democrat frontbench at present. [1] However, the presence of the US-led military forces in Iraq has been the most visible aspect of the occupation, and therefore it is little surprise that, despite their very different starting points, the first set of movements has largely adopted the slogans, personnel and political impact of the second.

If the only goal of the anti-war movement were the withdrawal of significant numbers of Coalition personnel from Iraq, it is likely that it would be able to think of itself as having achieved that goal in large part by the end of 2006. The predominant strategy of the US and UK, particularly since the reformulation of US objectives after the mission of Gen. Gary Luck in January 2005, has been to train the armed forces nominally under the control of the Iraqi government so that they, and not Coalition military personnel, are on the “front line” in combating the insurgencies. This strategy has been augmented by diverting spending away from services and civil infrastructure and towards the Iraqi military. [2] The use of Iraqi battalions as front line troops against the insurgencies, if broadly successful, means that Coalition forces inside Iraq will not need to remain at the current level of deployment of over 160,000 personnel. [3] There are already approximately 22,000 fewer US military personnel in Iraq than in January 2005, as part of a general though largely unannounced policy of scaling down forces there. Similarly, there are plans to reduce the British contingent in Iraq gradually throughout 2006. According to numerous accounts, the US has also abandoned its plan to retain permanent or “enduring” bases in Iraq in which it would station a number of its combat brigades.

However, it is important not to conflate the number of Coalition troops in Iraq with the extent of US-UK control over Iraq. The Coalition powers exercise control in various ways in Iraq, and intend to retain this control well past the reduction in troop numbers in 2006. With this in mind, it is more appropriate to consider the consequences and extent of disengagement, a broader concept that encompasses not only the military sphere but also the economic and political spheres, and not only those of troop withdrawal. The purpose of this paper is to look at the different types of disengagement that could be implemented, and to examine their likely impact if so. It will consider primarily the consequences of Coalition disengagement as a whole, but in its final section it will consider the consequences of UK disengagement if it were to take place without simultaneous US disengagement. This paper does not try to advocate all or any of these forms of disengagement: its purpose is to outline the possibilities rather than to urge political action.

(i) Disengagement of full combat units

At present, the Coalition mid-term strategy is to reduce their troop presence firstly within Iraq's cities, relocating them to bases outside towns and on Iraq's borders, and then overall. Coalition troops already do not spend as much of their time patrolling within urban areas. This is particularly pronounced within Basra, which British troops have not patrolled systematically since 2004. British policy has long been to avoid hostile areas, as demonstrated by the way in which British troops only entered the town of Majar al-Kabir once between the clashes of June 2003 and the end of 2004.

Coalition policy since early 2005 has been to gradually reposition military units outside urban areas, and only to use them when Iraqi forces have either disintegrated (as happened during the assault on Falluja in April 2004), turned their allegiance away from the Coalition, or were seen to be unable by themselves to defeat the insurgency (for example, during the assault on Tal Afar in September 2005). This policy has not been fully implemented yet: US troops remains prominent within Baghdad and have continued conducting extensive raids on Ramadi, for example. However, there has been the handover of military facilities to Iraqi forces: by 13 November 2005, 15 of the Coalition's 110 bases had been transferred to Iraqi units (and another 13 closed down), many of which were within Iraq's major cities. [4] In some recent assaults on towns alleged to contain insurgents, Iraqi troops have been in the majority: the assault on Tal Afar in September 2005 is a case in point. There is strong political pressure from within the US administration to hand over large areas of Iraq to the formal control of Iraqi security forces, and to draw down their forces shortly afterwards. Senior Coalition officials are already speaking of the objective of removing their full-scale operational brigades from Iraq within a period of eighteen months to two years. The Security Council’s mandate for the Coalition’s presence in Iraq terminates on 31 December 2006, [5] and one prospect is for the US not to request its renewal. This could then be presented as a success to the US electorate, particularly in time for the mid-term Congressional elections in November 2006.

The reduction in Coalition troop numbers to significantly lower levels than at present would reduce the rate of casualties of Coalition troops simply by virtue of there being fewer Coalition personnel in the country to attack. The Coalition draw-down plan is not conditional upon an abatement in the overall level of violence, despite their occasional public claims to this effect: indeed, the reduction in troop numbers over recent months has occurred alongside a heightening of the insurgency, with a level of attacks that has been greater than at almost any point since the invasion occurred: 92 attacks occurred on average per day in early November 2005, compared with 52 per day in June 2004 or 70 per day in May 2005. [6]

One possibility is that the reduction of Coalition troop numbers will take away the primary reason for the insurgency. That is, if US troops were not so visible on Iraq streets and roads, the Iraqi population – particularly those who have actively supported the insurgency in the past – will no longer consider themselves as living under occupation, and thus be less hostile to the Iraqi government and more readily drawn exclusively into the peaceful political process. Cooperation between the population in areas of insurgency (principally the governorates of al-Anbar, Salah al-Din, Ninewa and Baghdad) and Iraqi security and intelligence forces would be more forthcoming, leading to the capture or killing of those who would reject any peaceful resolution. Alternatively, the international jihadis will move to other locations, as they would no longer be able to confront US forces in Iraq. This, at least, is what the optimists within the Coalition have been arguing during most of 2005.

However, it is more likely that a reduction in the overall level of political violence, committed either by the military forces aligned with the Iraqi government or by the insurgents, would depend on the extent to which the Iraqi state and the political process had become – and were perceived to have become – the possession of all sectors of the Iraqi people rather than that of a foreign power or segment of the Iraqi population. That is, the bulk of the insurgency is most likely opposed not to just the presence of foreign military personnel in Iraq, but to foreign control, even if exercised at a distance, over their country. There is also the common belief in western and central Iraq that the formerly exiled Shi'a leadership that now hold the key positions within the country, most notably those of Prime Minister and Interior Minister, are in their positions because of their allegiance to US power, and are servants to it. From the perspective of the Iraqi government, the Sunni Arab population are perceived as resisting their rule and unwilling to accept the outcome of the democratic process, thus legitimising the use of the state’s military force against areas in which the Sunni Arabs are a majority. These perceptions form the basis of the newly sectarian nature of political debate and accusations, especially since December 2004.

Some of the disadvantages of a draw-down of troops that have been asserted by supporters of retaining a large military presence are as follows. One argument has been that the current Iraqi government is unlikely to be able to hold onto power if the Coalition were to leave in large numbers. However, this perhaps would not be a bad thing: any future Iraqi government would have to make sure that the interests of the Sunni Arab population were catered for within a new governance structure, to prevent the continued rebellion in areas in which the Sunni Arabs constitute a majority. A second argument has been that if Coalition troops leave Iraq, there will be much greater involvement by the military and paramilitary forces of Iraq’s neighbouring states. This is possible, but there is already extensive influence of sections of the Iranian government in southern Iraq and over many of the groups in the Ja‘fari government. It is far from clear why this would increase, and why Iranian influence would precipitate other states’ mobilisation to counter Iranian power, if the Coalition were to withdraw more of its troops.

A third argument has been that civil war is more likely if Coalition troops leave the country – that is, sectarian conflict is only contained through an extensive Coalition presence. This is probably an inverted reading of the origin of sectarianism in present-day Iraq: the sectarian conflict has arisen because many in the Sunni Arab community see the Iraqi state as having been handed over to the Shi‘i political leadership by the US, in return for their ‘collaboration’ with the occupation. If the Shi‘i political leadership remained in power through their allegiance to the US, broader and more violent sectarian conflict might ensue. However, this is then an argument against retaining that perception of foreign control, not for maintaining more foreign control.

Therefore, whilst a large-scale reduction in the Coalition military presence in Iraq would lessen the numbers of Coalition fatalities, it is unlikely to lead to a cessation of the struggle between the insurgents and the Iraqi government, as long as that government is seen to be an agent of foreign control. Moreover, this struggle has played itself out through attacks on civilian populations, with immense costs to the security and wellbeing of the Iraqi people.

(ii) Disengagement of military control

The Coalition retains both direct and indirect control over Iraq's armed forces at present. Through the structure of the Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I), the overall command of all military forces in Iraq is delegated to a US commander, at present Gen. George W. Casey. This structure could continue, conceivably, even if there were no operational US brigades in Iraq.

The commander of MNF-I also acts as the senior security advisor to the Iraqi prime minister. The Coalition also provides a number of advisors to each Iraqi ministry, including the ministries of defence and the interior. These advisors are in effect making policy still on behalf of their Iraqi counterparts, particularly given the limited expertise available to the Iraqi ministries after the processes of de-Ba‘thification, the professional exodus and the installation of party officials as administrators in place of experienced personnel.

In addition, the US and UK have large training teams embedded within nascent Iraqi forces, whose overt task is to educate, advise and monitor those forces, but whose actual role is better characterised as being that of commanding Iraqi units. The Coalition military retains the only operational communications network within Iraq, and thus acts as the liaison mechanism for Iraqi units with each other and with the operating bases. [7]

What would be the consequences of the disengagement in the near future of these facilities? One strong possibility is that the battalions established through MNF-I would simply collapse. Although US officials assert that there are 91 Iraqi battalions in combat, and that 24 battalions hold responsibility for areas of Iraq, none of these units operate at present without Coalition advisors and support; [8] few, if any, could. [9] However, it would be unrealistic to believe that this lack of independent functioning were due to the absence of Iraqi ability. After all, Iraq had a fully operational military capacity before 2003. By maintaining a position of dependence on MNF-I personnel and resources, the development of Iraq’s armed forces may be stunted. Furthermore, Iraq’s armed forces would not need to be used if there were no insurgency. The attention placed on the development of the capabilities of these forces is in some ways a way of avoiding addressing why the insurgency is so sizeable in the first place.

One argument for retaining the engagement of Coalition training facilities for Iraq’s armed forces has been that Iraqi personnel need to be re-trained so that they no longer act as a repressive agent within Iraqi society as they did under the ancien régime, but instead observe human rights and humanitarian law in their practice. A similar argument is made about the re-training of Iraq’s police force. This argument presupposes that Coalition training is enhancing the good practice of Iraq’s military and police forces. Given the actions of Iraqi armed forces in Tal Afar in September 2005, in which there was the widespread killing of civilians, and other recent military operations, this is far from clear. Coalition personnel have been complicit in many of the human rights abuses committed in post-invasion Iraq, from the torture practiced at Abu Ghrayb and routinely conducted during interrogation, to the use of napalm-like MK77 firebombs and white phosphorus, to the mass arrests of individuals kept without due process of law. [10] The argument that Coalition training inculcates human rights-observant practice in Iraqi officials rings hollow when compared with the scale of the human rights abuses in modern Iraq.

A further argument has been that if the Coalition were to withdraw its support from the Iraqi armed forces and police, Iraq would become increasingly fragmented, with the place of the armed forces taken over by militias. However, this process has already largely occurred. The Coalition has used political party organisations as a route to recruit members to the armed forces and police services, and many of those recruited in this way have retained their links to and affiliations with the political parties despite serving as members of the security forces. In this way, the Coalition has served to bolster, rather than to demobilise, party militias. It is therefore far from clear that the disengagement of the Coalition from Iraqi police and military units would lead to a growth in militia power. 

(iii) Economic and political disengagement

Coalition engagement with Iraq rests not only in the military and security sphere but also politically and economically. The attempts by the US-led Coalition to transform Iraq’s economy from a centrally planned model into a neoliberal form have been extensively discussed, and will not be replayed in full here. [11] However, the marketisation of Iraq is bolstered by the high present levels of dependency upon Coalition funds for Iraq’s development purposes. Despite having the third largest proven oil reserves in the world, the revenues accrued from oil sales at present remain low due to the high level of sabotage and smuggling of oil across borders. The Coalition-administered IRRF remains a major source of income for ongoing projects within the country.

This has given the US the leading role in remodelling Iraq’s economy, a process that Iraqis themselves have largely been locked out of. The lack of Iraqi participation was noted by Larry Crandall, who served as deputy head of the US reconstruction programme until the June 2004 handover:

I know it is still true that the reconstruction program out there has very little Iraqi participation. You hardly ever hear members of the Iraqi government talk about it, be it in terms of their support for it, their concern about it, their participation in it, and it’s simply because they don’t understand it very well. Therefore, they don’t know what to say about it and they have very little opportunity to participate in it, because it’s basically implemented through American contractors who have little, if any, contact with significant members of the Allawi administration out there or the previous interim government administration. [12]

The US in particular has been keen to secure international investment for developing the oil sector, most likely in the form of long-term production sharing agreements in which multinational corporations would take a sizeable slice of Iraqi oil income. [13] Rehabilitation under US lead has so far been largely ineffective, due to delays arising from insecurity and lack of funds. [14] The present Iraqi oil minister has favoured production sharing agreements due to the inability of Iraq to raise the necessary capital by itself for the development of its oil reserves.

Iraq’s current economic problems stem in large part from its inability to generate enough revenue through its oil sales. If the insurgency were to abate significantly, such that sabotage to Iraq’s oil pipelines were not a continual problem, Iraq would not need to be dependent on US and corporate funds both for its own budget and for the development of its oil sector. Economic disengagement – both a direct transfer of remaining funds to the Iraqi government and the removal of support to the major oil corporations in their attempts to establish a long-term presence in Iraq – would thus allow greater Iraqi control over their economy. It would however place Iraq at further economic risk if sabotage continued to disrupt Iraq’s oil sector significantly.

On the political side, the strong alignment of the US government in particular with the Ja‘fari government on the international stage is a major factor behind the widespread perception in Iraq that the Iraqi government is a foreign tool rather than an indigenous creation. US and UK political leaders have presented the participation of Iraqi citizens in the country’s elections in January 2005 and the referendum of October 2005 are their successes. [15] Those remarks, broadcast widely within Iraq itself, have acted to discourage those Iraqis who have long disagreed with US policy from participating in the political process, as their participation is taken as confirmation of the validity of US policies towards their country. Political disengagement will involve not treating the political process in Iraq as the property of the US or UK, but instead a process that has its own autonomy.

UK unilateral disengagement

UK unilateral disengagement will have a very limited impact by itself in the fields of military control, economic involvement and political support. Although the UK has had key personnel in the military training force (MNSTC-I), there is no particular reason why they could not be replaced quite easily with US personnel. The one sphere that would require more substantial adjustment if there were a UK unilateral move would be in military control over the south-east sector of Iraq (including the city of Basra), which the British have had responsibility for since April 2003. However, UK troop numbers will probably be falling to little more than 3,500 by late 2006, and the US could if it chose simply replace those personnel without too much difficulty, particularly given the draw-down over the rest of the country.

The main impact of a unilateral UK move would be political and indirect rather than practical and direct. It is likely that the removal of the UK military presence, the training personnel, the economic engagement and the political support would become a significant factor in the increasingly prominent US debate about the future of their engagement with Iraq. Although the consequences are hard to predict, it is possible that a unilateral UK disengagement in these fields could prompt a similar measures from the US.