The dossier transformed

(published in part in The Independent on Sunday, 17 August 2003)

The British government changed the title of its September 2002 dossier on Iraq at the last minute to portray a situation in Iraq that at least some of its most senior experts did not accept as valid.

Documents released by the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly show not only that the claims about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were strengthened in the two weeks before the dossier's release, but also that a crucial alteration was made to the title. The last draft of the dossier available to the inquiry from 19 September was entitled "Iraq's programme for weapons of mass destruction". These words even remain in the header of the internet page on the Downing Street website which contains the final version of the dossier. But the title on the page, in both the internet and printed versions, is simply "Iraq's weapons of mass destruction".

The change is significant: referring to a weapons "programme" does not assume they exist, or that there is on-going production of them. The most it indicates is that a situation has been created in which production could begin in future. UN weapons inspectors in Iraq throughout the second half of the 1990s oriented their work towards uncovering the potential for Iraq to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as there was little evidence that actual weapons existed in that period or that production was taking place.

The original title may have reflected the view of the bulk of the intelligence community that one could only draw attention to suspect programmes, rather than existing weapons. It was a view that Tony Blair publicly disputed, claiming repeatedly that Iraq had these weapons and was producing more, and that this made Iraq a serious threat. By contrast, the view of Dr Kelly was that Iraqi programmes had to be the focus of attention. In a conversation on 30 May, recorded by BBC Newsnight journalist Susan Watts and played to the inquiry, he says the concern "was not so much what [the Iraqis] have now but what they would have in the future. But that unfortunately wasn't expressed strongly in the dossier, because that takes away the case for war to a certain extent".

A member of the Defence Intelligence Staff, who identified himself as "probably the most senior and experienced intelligence community official working on 'WMD'", wrote just prior to the dossier's release to Tony Cragg, then the deputy chief of defence intelligence, to express formal reservations about the dossier. According to Martin Howard, Mr Cragg's successor, the reservation was in part that "the language was too strong on the continued production of chemical and biological agents. These concerns related to the foreword, executive summary and main text."

Neither the most experienced British official engaged in the Iraqi disarmament programme - Dr Kelly - nor the most senior British intelligence official working on non-conventional weapons accepted that Iraq had continued to produce prohibited weapons. The on-going production of weapons was a crucial element of the case for a threat from Iraq, because few believed that Iraq could have retained extensive amounts of viable chemical or biological agents from before 1991, due to the rapid deterioration of most types of these materials. .

Mr Howard advised the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, to acknowledge to the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, which meets behind closed doors and reports only to the Prime Minister, that the intelligence official, and one other member of the defence intelligence staff, had expressed reservations. But he told the inquiry that these individuals had not seen "sensitive" new information, and so were not able to appreciate the stronger new claim.

This justification is questionable, however: it is hard to see why the most senior defence intelligence official on WMD would be denied access to information on the subject. Nor did this explanation by Mr Howard appear in any of the correspondence between himself and the sceptical official that was released by the inquiry.

The suspicion that the intelligence community focused on Iraq's WMD potential rather than existing weapons is increased by the changes to the text visible in the limited excerpts released so far during the Hutton inquiry from earlier drafts of the September dossier. The draft of the dossier from 10 September - two weeks before its release - concludes: "Intelligence confirms that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687." This is changed in the final version of the dossier to: "Intelligence shows that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and has continued to produce chemical and biological agents."

Later on the same page of the 10 September draft is the only allegation that Iraq actually has such weapons, but it is phrased ambiguously: "Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available, either from pre-Gulf War stocks or more recent production." In the final version of the dossier, this is strengthened to: "Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both from pre-Gulf War stocks and more recent production".

Similarly, the claim about how weapons could be used within 45 minutes was strengthened between the draft of the dossier dated 16 September and that published eight days later. The earlier version raises a possibility, not a certainty: "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within forty five minutes of an order to do so." The version released to the public lost the element of uncertainty: "military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them."

Even in the published version of the dossier, as BBC Correspondent Andrew Gilligan pointed out at the inquiry, the description of Iraq's potential to produce chemical and biological weapons is provided in detail, while the claim about continuing production is merely asserted. At one point "the most immediate threat" from Iraq is identified as "Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare facilities", adding that "their limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to a continuing research and development programme". But the dossier then goes on to claim that there is actual production of warfare agents. This is what is highlighted in the Prime Minister's foreword and in his subsequent speech to the House of Commons.

One possibility, aired by Mr Gilligan, was that these more arresting claims were added into the dossier at a late stage, to shift from an original focus on potential "programmes". The distinction between "programmes" for weapons and the weapons themselves gained political significance after the Prime Minister told the parliamentary liaison committee, made up of the chairs of the select committees, on 8 July this year that he had "absolutely no doubt at all that we will find evidence of weapons of mass destruction programmes". The change in language, away from earlier claims that actual weapons would be found, was not lost on his critics.

Ironically, the emphasis on weapons programmes that was taken out of the dossier's title at the last moment has been reinserted by Mr Blair with the failure to find weapons in Iraq. This has also been the focus of the Iraq Survey Group, the CIA initiative inside Iraq led by David Kay, a vocal proponent of the notion that Iraq's weapons posed a severe threat to international security prior to the war. The Iraq Survey Group is expected to release an interim report in mid-September on their discoveries so far.

The Hutton inquiry has also provided an indication of the likely contents of this report. A memorandum disclosed in the inquiry reported on the visit of Martin Howard, deputy chief of defence intelligence, to Iraq in July: "David Kay seems to have given the Group a sense of direction and urgency. He is in close touch with [CIA Director George] Tenet. Document exploitation in particular is proving fruitful." The reference in the last sentence would indicate that the most that is expected from the report is an indication of the former Iraqi regime's activities in planning programmes, rather than a report on weapons that had been found.

We are unlikely to have heard the last about how the transformations in the dossier occurred. So far none of the witnesses from within the intelligence community have disclosed a role in making alterations to the dossier after 19 September. When it left their hands, it appears, it was still called "Iraq's programme for weapons of mass destruction". Perhaps the Downing Street officials due to appear before the committee this week, including Alastair Campbell, will be able to shed light on how it became a dossier instead about "Iraq's weapons of mass destruction".

(see also sidebar article)

Author: Glen Rangwala

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