The abridged dossier and some evaluations

By Glen Rangwala and Andrew Johnson

1. The UK dossier of September 2002 - abridged

Foreword by the Prime Minister:

The document is based on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest. (2)

What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, (3) that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme. I am in no doubt the threat is current and serious. The document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. (4)

Executive Summary:

As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:

Recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme; (5)

Illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads; (6)

Has already begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.

Part 1: Iraq's Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programmes

We have a range of intelligence about these programmes and Saddam's intentions. The main conclusions are that:

Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of UNSCR 687, which has included recent production of chemical and biological agents; (2)

Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles;

Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in breach of UNSCR 687 (5). Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil application in Iraq (7);

Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons;

Iraq's military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military is able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so (4).

Chemical and Biological Weapons JIC Assessment: 1999-2002

In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agents within months.

Chemical and biological agents: surviving stocks

Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed. No convincing proof of any kind has been produced to support this claim.

Chemical agent: production capabilities

Intelligence shows Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent. Plants formerly associated with chemical warfare programmes have been rebuilt.

Parts of the al-Qa'qa' chemical complex damaged in the 1991 Gulf War have been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. While phosgene does have industrial uses, it can also be used as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent. (8)

Iraq has retained the expertise for chemical warfare research, agent production and weaponisation. Iraq's claim to have destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be confirmed and is almost certainly untrue.

Chemical and biological agents: delivery means

These include: free-fall bombs; artillery shells and rockets; helicopter and aircraft airborne sprayers

L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme: We know from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which is potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area. (9)

Summary

Iraq has:

The capability to produce the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin and VX capable of producing mass casualties;

A biological agent production capability and can produce at _least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Iraq has also developed mobile facilities to produce biological agents.

Iraq retains many of its experienced nuclear scientists and technicians who are specialised in the production of fissile material and weapons design (5).

There is evidence that Iraq has sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa (7).

We judge that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources, Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years.

Ballistic missiles

In early 2002 the JIC concluded that Iraq had begun to develop missiles with a range of more than 1,000km. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. Intelligence also indicates that Iraq has worked on extending its range to at least 200km in breach of UN Security Resolution 687 (6).

According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles in breach of UN Security Resolution 687. They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel (2).

2. Evaluations

(1) The Intelligence and Security Committee reported on Thursday that "the jury is still out on the accuracy of the intelligence, the assessments and therefore the dossier" on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The idea of a jury sitting in order to assess intelligence material is as appealing as it is unlikely, but in its absence the contents of the September dossier can be contrasted with some straightforward facts.

(2) The ISC could only find two justifications for this claim. There could be such a threat if Iraq retained al-Hussein missiles. Or, Iraq could fire chemical or biological weapons at British aircraft in the "no-fly zones", imposed over the north and south of Iraq without UN approval. The first justification is shaky at best. The second falls on the underlying problem in claiming that the illegal presence of British aircraft in another country's airspace was necessary for the national interest in the first place.

(3) The ISC, with the full range of British intelligence reports on Iraq from 1990 onwards, was not able to find any material to support the claim that last year, Iraq was still producing chemical and biological weapons. The strongest claim in the intelligence reports was that Iraq could produce some of these weapons at short notice, although production of nerve agents such as sarin and VX would take months of work.

The UN inspectors and the Pentagon-based Iraq Survey Group currently in Iraq have similarly found no traces of the production of chemical or biological weapons in recent years. Many of the sites named by the September dossier as being potentially engaged in the production of prohibited weapons have been found to have been disused for years.

(4) At the Hutton inquiry, Sir John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, said this claim actually referred to battlefield weapons such as artillery or mortars. Dr Brian Jones, a retired senior analyst in the Defence Intelligence Staff, told the Inquiry that the claim was "nebulous" and second-hand, possibly from a source aiming "to influence rather than inform".

(5) All the evidence suggests that there was no nuclear programme in Iraq after 1991. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) record that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary told them "that all UK-owned intelligence that was relevant" to the UN inspections was passed onto the inspectors. Despite this, Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the UN nuclear inspections body, the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the Security Council in March that "we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq." Last week, he refuted the argument that Iraq had retained personnel to work on a programme. "The former cadre of nuclear experts was being increasingly dispersed and many key figures were reaching retirement or had left the country," he said.

(6) This claim, accompanied by full-page maps of potential targets, was in contrast to UN expert assessments that accepted that all but two of the 819 ballistic missiles held by Iraq prior to 1991 were destroyed. Iraq denied having missiles with a range greater than 200km, and no weapons of this range were fired by Iraq during the conflict. None have been found by inspectors and are now presumed by the Iraq Survey Group not to have existed.

(7) The ISC has confirmed, for the first time, that the two intelligence sources drawn upon by the British Government indicated that the country in question in Africa was Niger. The uranium mines in Niger are under the control of a French-led consortium. It would have been impossible for Iraq to import uranium without the permission of the French. The government of Niger and the Iraqi official who dealt with relations with Niger have confirmed that uranium sales were never discussed between the countries. It is difficult to see how either has a reason to lie at present.

(8) A UK government chemical weapons consultant told the Hutton inquiry, this claim was a "stupid mistake". The unnamed individual, who had visited al-Qa'Qa' plant as a UN weapons inspector, had found that the phosgene made was used for legitimate purposes, and that the Iraqi regime had never shown any indication that it would use phosgene in the production of chemical weapons.

(9) The only UAVs found by the Iraq Survey Group were found to be for reconnaissance. They were large enough only to be able to carry a camera and could not carry chemical or biological weapons.

Author: Glen Rangwala

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