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Changing stories on Iraq (23 January 2004) by Raymond Whitaker
and Glen Rangwala
Partly published in the Independent on Sunday as "The 50 lies,
exaggerations, distortions and half truths that took this country to war"
(25 January 2004)
1. What was all that about?
- I have never put our justification for action as regime change.
Tony Blair, House of Commons, 18 March 2003.
- Tonight, British servicemen and women are engaged from air, land and
sea. Their mission: to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and disarm
Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.
Tony Blair, televised address to the nation, 20 March 2003
- I have always said to people throughout that ... our aim has been
the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.
Tony Blair, press conference, 25 March 2003
Within days, Mr Blair contradicts himself about the aims of
the war.
- we have high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction.
That is what this war was about and it is about. And we have high confidence
it will be found.
Ari Fleischer, White House press secretary, 10 April 2003
- But for this military action, Saddam Hussein and his sons would still
be in absolute control ... free to continue the repression and butchery
of their people which ... we now know was on such a savage scale that
victims number hundreds of thousands.
Tony Blair, article in 'News of the World', 16 November 2003
Regime change again becomes a central justification of the
conflict.
- You know how passionately I believed in this cause and in the wisdom
of the conflict as the only way to establish long-time peace and stability.
Tony Blair to British troops in Iraq, 4 January 2004
No mention of WMD was made on this trip. But with Saddam now
in custody and the insurgency in Iraq showing no sign of abating, the
PM finds a new reason for the war.
- As for the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, there
can be no doubt ... that those weapons existed. It is the job of the
Iraq Survey Group to find out what has happened, which it will do.
Tony Blair, House of Commons, 21 January 2004
Mr Blair uses lawyer's language, ignoring Iraq's claim that
the weapons existed, but were destroyed more than a decade ago. His
next sentence implicitly acknowledges WMD may never be found.
- For reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy,
we settled on the one issue everyone could agree on, which was weapons
of mass destruction...
Paul Wolfowitz, US deputy defence secretary, 'Vanity Fair', June
2003
The Bush administration made no secret of its desire for "regime
change". Some were ready to admit that WMD was a red herring.
2. Weapons, weapons programmes, or the desire for weapons?
- We know that he has stockpiles of major amounts of chemical and biological
weapons.
Tony Blair, interview for NBC TV, 3 April 2002
From early 2002, the Prime Minister began to emphasise claims
that Iraq had stockpiles of weapons left over from before the 1991 war,
without mentioning that the UN inspectors largely believed that most
chemical and biological agents would have deteriorated over that twelve
year period to the point of uselessness.
- Iraq poses a threat to the world because of its manufacture and development
of weapons of mass destruction.
Jack Straw, interview with David Frost, 24 March 2002
Claims that Iraq was still producing chemical and biological
weapons were also prominent, even though the UN weapons inspectors had
never shown that there was any production of prohibited weapons after
1991.
- It [the dossier] concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons,
that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and
active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons,
which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own
Shia population; and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons
capability.
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 24 September 2002
Claims that Iraq not only had prohibited weapons, but that
it could use them at short notice, provided the headlines on the day
after the dossier was released. No such weapons were found in place
to be used once the invasion began.
- We have absolutely no doubt at all that these weapons of mass destruction
exist
Tony Blair, press conference, 25 March 2003
The Prime Minister repeatedly expressed certainty about the
existence of weapons. This contrasted with the original draft of the
September dossier drawn up by John Scarlett, chair of the Joint Intelligence
Committee, which said that Iraq had "probably" continued to produce
chemical and biological weapons.
- I have absolutely no doubt whatever that he was trying to reconstitute
weapons of mass destruction programmes. ... [Saddam Hussein] has always
been intending to develop these weapons.
Tony Blair to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, 8 July 2003
With the failure to find weapons, the Prime Minister resorted
in July 2003 to claims about weapons "programmes" and Saddam Hussein's
intentions. Claims about existing weapons dropped out of Tony Blair's
speeches.
- A: Saddam was a danger and the world is better off cause we got rid
of him.
Q: But stated as a hard fact, that there were weapons of mass destruction
as opposed to the possibility that he could move to acquire those weapons
still —
A: So what's the difference?
Q: Well —
A: The possibility that he could acquire weapons. If he were to acquire
weapons, he would be the danger. That's, that's what I'm trying to explain
to you.
President Bush, interview with ABC, 16 December 2003
President Bush retreated even further. For him the "possibility"
of Iraq obtaining weapons in future was now enough to have justified
the war.
- We are seeking all the facts - already the Kay report identified dozens
of weapons of mass destruction-related programme activities and significant
amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations.
George Bush, State of the Union address, 20 January 2004
By 2004, the President was not even asserting the existence
of weapons programmes, but "related programme activities". The new head
of the US-led Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer, said on 8 January
2004 that, "the prospects of finding existing weapons are just about
nil."
3. The Weapons
- Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminium tubes and other
equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium
for nuclear weapons.
George Bush, 7 October 2002
The White House ignored persistent evidence from US scientists
and the UN nuclear agency that the tubes were useless for centrifuges.
- The British government has learnt that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.
George Bush, 28 January 2003
The CIA knew the claim was based on crudely forged documents.
- We believe he [Saddam] has reconstituted nuclear weapons.
Vice President Dick Cheney, NBC's 'Meet the Press', 16 March, 2003
- Q: Reconstituted nuclear weapons. You misspoke.
A: Yeah. I did misspeak ... We never had any evidence that he had acquired
a nuclear weapon.
Mr Cheney on 'Meet the Press', 14 September 2003
The VP took six months to correct his eve-of-war assertion.
- On chemical weapons, the dossier shows that Iraq continues to produce
chemical agent for chemical weapons; has rebuilt previously destroyed
production plants across Iraq; has bought dual-use chemical facilities;
has retained the key personnel formerly engaged in the chemical weapons
programme; and has a serious ongoing research programme into weapons
production, all of it well funded.
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 24 September 2002
Claims about Iraq's ongoing production chemical and biological
weapons fell flat when all the sites named in the Prime Minister's dossier
were visited by UN weapons inspectors, and found to be clean.
- Parts of the al-Qa'qa' chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have
also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements
of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'.
Prime Minister's dossier of 24 September 2002
This claim was subject to ridicule by a government weapons consultant
and former UN weapons inspector, who told the Hutton inquiry that Iraq
had never used phosgene in weapons or shown any sign of wanting to do
so. He called it "a pretty stupid mistake for the British to make."
- Saddam Hussein has .. the wherewithal to develop smallpox.
Colin Powell to the Security Council, 5 February 2003
One of the most alarming claims was quickly shot down by the
UN inspectors, who pointed out that there was no evidence that Iraq
has any seed stock from which to produce smallpox. They'd said the same
thing five years earlier.
- We know that this man has got weapons of mass destruction. That sounds
like a slightly abstract phrase, but what we are talking about is chemical
weapons, biological weapons, viruses, bacilli and anthrax—10,000
litres of anthrax—that he has.
Jack Straw to the House of Commons, 17 March 2003
The British government persistently failed to distinguish
the weapons that the UN couldn't prove that Iraq had destroyed and weapons
it claimed Iraq still had. By mid-March, the Iraqi regime was providing
more detailed proof of the destruction of these weapons.
- On weapons of mass destruction, we know that the regime has them,
we know that as the regime collapses we will be led to them. We pledged
to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and we will keep that
commitment.
Tony Blair, press conference with President George Bush (8 April
2003)
- It is also possible that they decided that they would destroy them
[WMD] prior to a conflict.
Donald Rumsfeld to the Council on Foreign Relations, 27 May 2003
- We have already found two trailers, both of which we believe were
used for the production of biological weapons
Tony Blair, press conference in Poland, 30 May 2003
In fact, as the Hutton inquiry revealed, British's leading
biological weapons expert, David Kelly, had expressed the opposite view
after inspecting the trailers. Kelly "was of the view that these were
not biological weapons facilities", according to a senior defence official
who testified.
- It is not the most urgent priority now for us since Saddam has gone
...
Tony Blair, 30 May 2003
Finding WMD slides down the scale of importance.
- We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad
and east, west, south and north somewhat.
Donald Rumsfeld, 30 March 2003
- I should have said, 'I believe we're in that area. Our intelligence
tells us they're in that area,' and that was our best judgement.
Mr Rumsfeld, 10 September 2003
WMD excuse which is now most prevalent: we believed it at
the time.
- In a land mass twice the size of the UK it may well not be surprising
you don't find where this stuff is hidden.
Tony Blair, BBC interview with David Frost, 11 January 2004
- the Iraq Survey Group has already found massive evidence of a huge
system of clandestine laboratories, workings by scientists, plans to
develop long range ballistic missiles. Now frankly these things weren't
being developed unless they were developed for a purpose.
Tony Blair, interview with British Forces Broadcasting Service, 16
December 2003.
This claim was dismissed as a "red herring" by the US chief
administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer. The Iraq Survey Group had never
talked about a "massive" system, and didn't link the laboratories with
weapons production or research.
- Q: But it is absolutely clear now that the 45 minute thing and so
on, that the weapons of mass destruction idea and you've moved on to
talking about programmes now rather than weapons of mass destruction.
But that was wrong wasn't it? I mean that was wrong?
A: Well you can't say that at this point in time. What you can say is
that we received that intelligence about Saddam's programmes and about
his weapons that we acted on that, it's the case throughout the whole
of the conflict.
Tony Blair, interview with David Frost, 11 January 2004
Finally, the Prime Minister admitted doubt about whether he
had been wrong all along, but passes the buck for any mistakes to the
intelligence services.
4. The UN inspectors
- Is it not reasonable that Saddam provides evidence of destruction
of the biological and chemical agents and weapons the UN proved he had
in 1999? So far he has provided none.
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 25 February 2003
US and UK leaders repeatedly invoked alleged findings of the
UN to back up their claims about Iraq's weapons. In fact, the inspectors
in 1999 were keen to emphasise how they didn't have any proof that Iraq
had prohibited weapons, but they had suspicions that needed to be checked.
- The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient
to produce more than 38,000 litres of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject
millions of people to death by respiratory failure.
President Bush, State of the Union address, 28 January 2003
Unmovic explicitly contradicted this point: in March 2003,
they wrote that "it seems unlikely that significant undeclared quantities
of botulinum toxin could have been produced, based on the quantity of
media unaccounted for."
- By 1998, UN experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques
for their biological weapons programmes.
Colin Powell to the Security Council, 5 February 2003
Unmovic recorded in March 2003 that it "has no evidence that
drying of anthrax or any other agent in bulk was conducted."
- if Saddam Hussein does ... readmit the weapons inspectors and allow
them to do their job without restrictions and without conditions then
the case for military action recedes to the point almost of invisibility
and that is obvious, and is obvious too to the Saddam Hussein regime.
Jack Straw, interview with David Frost, 15 September 2002
Before Iraq readmitted the weapons inspectors in 2002, both
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary claimed that military action
would not follow if Iraq complied with the inspectors.
- Iraq was found guilty in 1991. Twelve years of defiance later, Saddam
Hussein is not entitled to any presumption of innocence. It is for him
to prove that he has, once and for all, given up what we know he has.
Jack Straw, speech on 21 February 2003
After Iraq re-admitted the inspectors, Jack Straw's language
changed: now the Iraqis were already guilty due to what had happened
since 1991.
- we need to be prepared to follow through resolutions with action,
as we did in the case of Iraq, which had defied UN Security Council
mandatory resolutions for more than a decade.
Jack Straw to the House of Commons, 27 November 2003
After no prohibited weapons were found, Jack Straw seemed
to forget that Iraq had readmitted inspectors: the reason for the invasion
was Iraq's history of defying the UN.
5. Abandoning the UN route
- Journeys are monitored by security officers stationed on the route
if they have prior intelligence. Any changes of destination are notified
ahead by telephone or radio so that arrival is anticipated. The welcoming
party is a give away.
The Prime Minister's dossier of 3 February 2003
The claim that weapons inspectors were being obstructed whilst
in Iraq was contradicted by Hans Blix, the chief inspector. He told
the Security Council in February 2003 that "In no case have we seen
convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors
were coming."
- But this time Saddam must understand. Now is the time for him to decide.
Passive rather than active co-operation will not do. Cooperation on
process not substance will not do. Refusal to declare properly and fully
what has happened to the unaccounted for WMD will not do. Resolution
1441 called for full, unconditional and immediate compliance. Not 10%,
not 20%, not even 50%, but 100% compliance. Anything less will not do.
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 26 February 2003
The Prime Minister raised the threshold at every opportunity,
so that even the slightest infringement by Iraq could be used to justify
a war. Nevertheless, Hans Blix head of Unmovic, reported on 7 March
2003 that Iraq was meeting this standard: the cooperation received could
be classed as "active, or even proactive".
- I have every confidence—and I have expressed that confidence—in
the weapons inspectors. ... As long as this regime is in place, and
as long as it is refusing to co-operate, the inspection process becomes
well-nigh impossible.
Jack Straw to the House of Commons, 17 March 2003
Jack Straw's claim that inspections were impossible, and so
inspectors should be pulled out, stood in stark contrast to the view
of the inspectors themselves, who reported on the advances being made
through their work.
- On Monday night, France said it would veto a second Resolution whatever
the circumstances.
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 18 March 2003
Mr Blair claimed that diplomatic solutions were impossible
because of French obstructionism at the Security Council. In fact, President
Chirac said that France would vote against any resolution that authorised
force whilst inspections were still working. Chirac said that he "considers
this evening that there are no grounds for waging war in order to ...
disarm Iraq", a position borne out by UN reports on the progress of
inspections. Jack Straw acknowledged in January 2004 that he had respect
for the French position on the invasion.
- the reason why the inspectors couldn't do their job in the end was
that Saddam wouldn't co-operate.
Tony Blair, interview on 4 April 2003
The extent of Iraqi disarmament was never acknowledged by
the British government. When the UN inspectors decided in 2003 that
one of Iraq's types of missiles had a range marginally greater than
that allowed by the UN, Iraq began destroy them, and was ahead of its
timetable to destroy its entire stock when the US ordered weapons inspectors
to leave the country.
- Never once did I come to this House and say that I believed that we
should not give the weapons inspectors more time because I did not think
that they were going to get any more co-operation than they had had
in the past.
Jack Straw to the House of Commons, 27 November 2003
The Foreign Secretary, through his triple negative, finally
seemed to acknowledge that the weapons inspectors were receiving increased
cooperation from the Iraqi regime at the time of the invasion.
- In the event of Saddam refusing to co-operate or being in breach,
there will be a further UN discussion, as we always said there would
be. To those who fear this resolution is just an automatic trigger point,
without any further discussion, paragraph 12 of the Resolution makes
it clear that is not the case.
Statement of the Prime Minister on Security Council Resolution 1441,
8 November 2002
When the UK successfully pushed for the UN to adopt a new
resolution on Iraq, they stressed that the UN would be central to the
decision-making process. Instead, when they claimed that Iraq had violated
the resolution, they did not convene a meeting at the Security Council
and said this was unnecessary.
- As the Foreign Secretary has pointed out, resolution 1441 gives the
legal basis for this [war]
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 12 March 2003
The Prime Minister contradicted his earlier statement, now
claiming that the resolution did allow war.
6. Iraq and terrorism
- There is no hidden agenda; this is not a prelude to a wider war. Our
objectives are linked to the events of 11th September ... there is no
evidence linking Iraq to the events of 11th September; there is no evidence
either so far that links Iraq to the anthrax attacks in the United States.
It's important that we emphasise those things.
Geoff Hoon, 29 October 2001, ruling out an attack on Iraq due to
lack of links with the September 11th attack in order to justify the
war on Afghanistan.
- Iraq has trained al-Qa'ida members in bomb-making and poisons and
deadly gases
George Bush, 7 October 2002
This claim, four days before Congress authorised war, omitted
classified caveats and warnings that the information might be unreliable.
- There is some intelligence evidence about linkages between members
of al-Qa'ida and people in Iraq.
Tony Blair to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, 21 January
2003
Blair had just seen an intelligence report, later leaked,
which said al-Qa'ida was "in ideological conflict" with the "apostate"
Iraqi regime, and there were no current links.
7. After the war
- the oil revenues, which people falsely claim that we want to seize,
should be put in a trust fund for the Iraqi people administered through
the UN.
Tony Blair to the House of Commons, 18 March 2003
Britain co-sponsored a resolution to the Security Council,
which was passed in May as Resolution 1483, that gave the US and UK
control over Iraq's oil revenues. There is no UN-administered trust
fund. The UN was meant to participate in an "International Advisory
and Monitoring Board", which did not commence work until December 2003,
and has yet to appoint external auditors to monitor the oil revenues.
- The United Kingdom should seek a new Security Council Resolution that
would affirm ... the use of all oil revenues for the benefit of the
Iraqi people.
Motion to the House of Commons for war with Iraq, moved by Tony Blair,
18 March 2003
Iraq's oil revenues have been used to pay US firms, many of
which have close connections with the US administration, and often at
vastly inflated prices. Iraq still has to pay compensation for the invasion
of Kuwait out of its oil revenues. Due to the absence of international
oversight, there is little transparency in how the other revenues are
being used.
- over some period of months, the Iraqis will have their government
selected by Iraqi people.
Donald Rumsfeld, press conference, 13 April 2003
The plan for elections within Iraq soon hit the buffers. The
US-led administration now holds to the view that elections should be
postponed until the end of 2005, almost three years after the invasion.
This has provoked intense disquiet among the majority Shi'a community
in particular.
- This is about building a new civil society in Iraq after 35 years
when we know women were suppressed, and ensuring women have a voice
in Iraq.
Patricia Hewitt, trade and industry secretary, 16 October 2003
On 29 December, the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council passed
a decision that took away female rights in matters of divorce, marriage,
inheritance and child custody, changing them back to their "traditional"
form. As a result, Iraqi women have less rights in personal status issues
than at any time since the 1950s.
- We are agreed on the importance of the role of the United Nations
in post-conflict Iraq. That is a role that should be there, not simply
in respect of humanitarian issues, but also in respect of political
and reconstruction issues that arise.
Tony Blair, press conference, 16 April 2003
The UN has not been granted political role in Iraq, other
than acting in an advisory capacity to the Coalition Provisional Authority,
the US-led administration. Its international staff were withdrawn from
Iraq in September 2003, the administration of the ration was handed
over to the CPA, and it is rarely consulted on the future of the country.
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