Iraqi National Congress (INC, al-Mu‘tamar al-Watani al-Iraqi): created in June 1992 to provide an umbrella for the disputing opposition factions, based on the Joint Action Committee created by Damascus in December 1990 (see INM entry below). Founding conference comprised of 160 delegates in Vienna, and (crucially) included KDP and PUK participation; SCIRI and al-Daw‘a al-Islamiyya were involved in the preparatory work & sent observers, but did not participate. This conference created a national assembly of 87 members, with 22 seats for the Kurds. This assembly was expanded to a meeting of 234 representatives of Iraqi opposition groups in Salahuddin, Iraqi Kurdistan on 27Oct92, which incorporated SCIRI for the first time, and which ratified the decisions made at Vienna. Initially received the affiliation of 19 opposition groups, and the support of the CIA, with the Rendon Group (a Washington-based public relations firm) coordinating its actions (& reportedly even choosing its name). Conceived and led by Ahmad Chalabi (separate biography here). The Salahuddin conference created a 3-man presidential council, of a Kurd (Mas'ud Barzani of the KDP), a Shi'a (Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum of Ahl al-Bayt centre, associated with al-Da'wa; originated from Najaf) and a Sunni (Hassan Mustafa al-Naqib, later of the INM), and a 26-member executive council, which was to manage the operation of the INC. Chalabi was the president of the executive council; vice-presidents were Hani al-Fekaiki (see RWP notes), Latif Rashid (from PUK), Humam Hamudi (from SCIRI); secretary of executive council was 'Abd al-Husayn Sha'ban (independent democrat). Full listing of initial executive council is here.

External base in London; field offices in Washington, Tehran and Damascus. Operationally based in Iraq at Salahuddin (north of Irbil) from Oct92, and brokered PUK-KDP truce after intra-Kurdish fighting began in May94. Supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and his replacement by a democratic federal state. Coup attempt of 5Mar95, in league with Maj.-Gen. Wafiq al-Samarra‘i (see HCNS notes below) failed when the US pulled out at the last moment, and the anticipated uprising in south/central Iraq did not occur. A number of member groups, including al-Daw‘a al-Islamiyya, the Iraqi Democratic Union and the Arab Nationalist Party, pulled out of the INC in 1995; Sha'ban had also resigned in 1994; SCIRI suspended participation in the executive council; Bahr al-'Ulum (May95) & Naqib (Aug95) both resigned from the presidential council. Sharif Ali bin al-Husayn took the Sunni place on the presidential council. Salahuddin base was routed by Iraqi forces on Aug96 incursion, with approx.200 of its personnel killed, and it has not been able to reconstruct this presence in Iraq until Apr03. Was sidelined when an alternative umbrella organisation looked like it would take shape in Aug95, under Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum; but this did not crystallise. A further attempt to revitalise the INC was the Mar99 meeting in Windsor which elected a new 7-member leadership council, made up of representatives from SCIRI, PUK, KDP, INA & 3 independents; the groupings all refused participation, and SCIRI, the ICP and the INA suspended their membership in the INC.

Funded by the US from its inception, reportedly receiving over $100 million in the first half of the 1990s; overtly funded after the US Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act 1998, which granted the opposition $97 million for military equipment, Pentagon training and facilities (and $2 million in broadcasting funds). Was funded for activities inside Iraq before Aug96, and again from Feb01. Was receiving an annual budget of $8 million. Retained support of the Pentagon and the US presidency (Dick Cheney is a long-time supporter). The State Department distrusted it (as did the CIA & British foreign office), though it established the Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) in 1999, to provide an organisational structure for State Department funding, with the INC's 7-member leadership council serving as its board of directors; the INCSF provided almost $33m from Mar00-Sept03, largely for Radio Hurriyya (which had broadcast before 1996 from a US tower in Kuwait), a satellite TV station Liberty TV (began in Aug01, costing $10m; planned to broadcast round the clock, but never transmitted for more than 4hrs per day), its newspaper, and for information collection. These funding arrangements were repeatedly interrupted due to policy disputes and claims about INCSF's lack of accountability for funds. This led to the closure of Liberty TV in May02; and the announcement of a cessation of funding from the INCSF for the information collection in May02 (effective in Aug02).

Held discussions in July 2002 with the INM about establishing a provisional government (reports collected here), but plans were postponed after internal disagreements. Reports from Aug02 that the Department of Defense has taken over the funding responsibility for the INC, though disagreements continue, eg over funds for intelligence-collection programme in Nov02. Was given a leading role in the 9Aug meeting of the opposition groups with US officials in Washington, effectively displacing the "Group of 4"; but disputes with them continued, especially over representation at the Brussels "unity" conference (scheduled to take place in Sept02, then 22Nov02, repeatedly postponed after no agreement over participants, with INC threats of a boycott); eventually taking place in London from 14-17Dec02.

From Oct02, Chalabi has been increasingly assertive that the INC would establish a transitional government, with him as its head, after the Ba'th are ousted; reports (1,2) from Feb03 indicate that the US has tentatively agreed. Recruited a paramilitary force (originally called the Iraq Liberation Army) to serve in northern Iraq, under the sponsorship of the US Dept of Defense. For this purpose, presented a list of 4000 recruits to Pentagon officials, of whom 1000 were selected on 17Dec02 to be given military training in Hungary with the U.S. Army's European Command, to provide the basis of a new Iraqi national army. The number of those selected rose to 3000 in Jan03, when 4-week training began at Taszar air base, Hungary ("Camp Freedom"); however, only approx 100 were selected to be in what was now named the "Free Iraqi Forces" (FIF), with US forces during the invasion of Iraq, serving as "attachees" or "augmentees" to liaise with the population. 5 members of the INC leadership - including Chalabi - moved to northern Iraq, via Iran, in late Jan03, after a special Treasury Department exemption was granted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control to allow State Department funds to go through Iran. It is claimed that the FIF, who accompanied Chalabi, were augmented by personnel from the PUK, raising their numbers to approx 700. The FIF accompanied Chalabi when US forces airlifted them to Nasiriya on 6Apr; they then moved to Baghdad where they set up temporary headquarters in the Iraqi Hunting Club in al-Mansur district. The FIF were disbanded on the orders of the CPA, rather than integrated into the new army as originally planned: this was reportedly because of the integration of largely untrained PUK personnel into their ranks. The INC claims to have 25 - 60 tonnes of intelligence documents captured from Special Security Organisation, mukhabarat and Ba'th party offices. Favoured blacklisting 30,000 former senior Ba'th party members from holding office or civil appointment in the post-Ba'th Iraq, a plan seemingly adopted by the CPA. Chalabi was the INC's representative on the Governing Council, and a member of the 9-person rotating presidency.

On 18May04, the Pentagon announced that it would stop its monthly payment of $335,000 to the INC for intelligence information on 30Jun. On 20May, after allegations that the INC had passed sensitive information to Iran, and claims over corruption, US and Iraqi forces raided the INC's offices and Chalabi's house in Baghdad. Despite this, it was accepted onto the United Iraqi Alliance list (169) in the January 2005 elections, with Chalabi placed tenth on its list of candidates.

London office is headed by Faisal Qaragholi, a petroleum engineer who openly favours a constitutional monarchy. Washington director is Intifadh K. Qanbar, who has built up links with the Zionist lobby groups, eg speaking at an AIPAC gathering on 7Oct02. Other spokespersons include Nabil Musawi, Zaab Sethna (Baghdad spokesman), Nizar Haidar (Karbala representative). Mudhar Shawkat (see INM below) joined prior to the 2003 invasion, becoming the head of the military wing, and deputy party leader. Website here; its weekly newspaper is al-Mu'tamar. Overview of US support is provided in CRS Report.

Iraqi National Accord (INA, al-Wifaq): created in December 1990, on the initiative of Saudi Prince Turki ibn Faysal, with the support of the CIA, and Jordanian and British agencies. Largely made up of Ba‘thists and former military officers who oppose Saddam Hussein's leadership; main constituency is Sunni Arabs in central Iraq. Leader is Dr Iyad Allawi, who serves as the Sec-Gen of the INA: separate biography is here. Also, Gen. Adnan Nuri (formerly of the Republican Guard, who secured funding from the CIA in 1992); Salih Omar ‘Ali al-Tikriti (former Iraqi ambassador to the UN, from the 1970s until 1982; head of the London office of Iraqi Freight Services until 1990; despite co-founding the INA with Allawi, he has withdrawn from a leadership role after a dispute over the Saudi funding of the radio station, which was reportedly embezzled - he continued to produce al-Wifaq paper until about 1998), Dr Tahsin Mu‘ala (the medical practitioner who had tended Saddam's wounds after the failed assassination attempt on Qasim in 1959), Ibrahim Janabi (former representative to Amman; former Ba'thist and intelligence officer in London; interview here); Salah al-Shaykhly (deputy planning minister in the 1970s; director of the Central Statistics Board, chancellor of the Central Bank; UN assistant secretary-general, then regional director of Arab section in the UNDP; took British citizenship, and lived in the UK in the 1990s; appointed as Iraq's ambassador to the UK on 19Jul04); and Nuri al-Badran (b. Basra, 1943, a former academic and diplomat who left Iraq in the early 1990s to join the INA; is the brother-in-law of Iyad Allawi; served as the INA's spokesman until his appointment as interior minister). Tawfiq al-Yasiri (see INCoalition below) was a leading INA member (aligned with Allawi) until he began participation in INC activities, and was expelled as a result. Spokesmen in Baghdad include 'Ali 'Abd al-Amir.

Originally under Saudi sponsorship, who promoted the INA to participate in the first congress of the JAC (see INM below); and helped the INA to establish radio station, Voice of Free Iraq. Arranged bomb blasts in Iraq from 1994 to demonstrate its credibility: included the bombing of a Baghdad cinema, which killed civilians; and outside Ba‘th newspaper offices. Abu Amneh al-Khadami, who claims to have organised the bombings, stated in January 1996 that these bombings were carried out to impress the CIA. Also reportedly bombed INC headquarters in Salahuddin in October 1995; the CIA investigated, but did not release results. Allegations resurfaced with news reports (1,2) in 2004. Counselled the US against supporting the INC / Samarra‘i coup attempt of Mar95, in favour of its own military scheme, which was scheduled to take place on 26Jun96. This had emerged out of a plan from Retd Gen. Muhammad Abdullah al-Shahwani, an ethnic Turkoman with 3 sons in the Revolutionary Guard, who had contacted the INA in Aug94. The INA in turn contacted MI6, and details were passed onto the CIA, whose operatives within UNSCOM helped coordinate the coup attempt: the Iraqi government became aware of the plot in advance, and 120 coup plotters were arrested (& mostly executed, including all 3 of Shahwani's sons) by the Iraqi regime. This left the INA very weak inside Iraq. However, it kept up close links with the CIA, who reorganised it from 1996, and UK intelligence; it remains the preferred CIA group, and the only national organisation in the "Group of 4" (with KDP, PUK and SCIRI). Activities in Iraq declined after Aug96 hostilities; retains offices in Dahuk, Sulaymaniyya, Zakhu, Salahuddin and Irbil. Main base is in Amman (established in Feb96). It seems to have had a significant role in coopting members of the Iraqi military, including during the invasion: Allawi, Shahwani and Sa'd al-Janabi (an Iraqi-American businessman who left Iraq in 1995, reportedly working for the US government and leading the "Iraqi Republican Group"), had leading roles.

The INA had a consistent role in the coordination of the opposition, taking positions in the follow-up committee established in Dec02; Allawi was also elected to the leadership council in Mar03, although he was prevented from reaching the meeting in Salahuddin itself due to Turkey not letting him cross the border. Nuri al-Badran said prior to the war that "the army, the Baath Party, civil servants and tribes" would play a major role in running post-Saddam Iraq. Allawi represented the INA on the Governing Council, and was one of its 9 rotating presidents; he also chaired the committee on internal security (the Supreme Security Committee). Badran was minister for the interior until he resigned on 8Apr04. Ibrahim Janabi was a senior member of the Security Committee. Both Allawi and Badran were closely involved with the creation of a new Iraqi intelligence apparatus, which is likely to include former members of Mukhabarat, and which was thought likely to be headed by Janabi. Instead, Muhammad al-Shahwani (see above, also close to the INA) was given the position of director of intelligence on 4Apr04. Allawi was appointed prime minister on 31May04. With minor parties, it formed the Iraqi List (285) for the January 2005 elections: it won 1.17m votes and came in third place overall; it holds 40 seats in the assembly. The INA's website is here; extracts from its Charter are here. Its weekly newspaper is Baghdad.
Main sources are Hiro (2001 and articles in Middle East International); Cockburn and Cockburn (1998).

Iraqi Communist Party (ICP, al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Iraqi): Established at a meeting of 8Mar35 in Baghdad (though some have claimed an earlier founding of the ICP on 31Mar34), which established the Association Against Imperialism: was initially made up of Baghdadi communists, largely from the Bab al-Shaykh mahallah (city quarter), but drew in existing communist groups from Basra and Nasiriyya. It published a journal, Kifah al-Sha'b, from Jul35 in the name of the ICP Central Committee; led by Asim Flayyeh until his arrest in Oct35. It gave early support to the Bakr Sidqi coup, and led demonstrations in favour of it, but relations deteriorated sharply when Sidqi aligned with the Iraqi nationalists; subsequent pan-Arab nationalist governments imprisoned or exiled its members. The central committee was reestablished when Yusuf Salman Yusuf (known later as "Fahd", Leopard; b.Baghdad, 1901, but grew up in Basra, moving to Nasiriya in 1919; of Chaldean Christian origin), and the founder of the Nasiriya group, returned from study in Moscow in Jan38: it published a journal, al-Sharara, from Dec40 (from Feb43, the main organ was al-Qa'ida, after al-Sharara was taken over by a rival and short-lived party wing), and Fahd was appointed first secretary of the party on 29Oct41. It supported the neutrality of the Rashid 'Ali government in Apr-May41 (as the Soviet Union was still neutral; the ICP later voiced its regret for this stance); in response, communist prisoners were released. It was tolerated to some extent when the monarchy was reestablished now that the Soviet Union had joined with the Allies in WWII, and with the ICP acting as popular challengers to the pan-Arabists, who were seen as susceptible to fascism; ICP gave formal support for the monarchy from Feb42 until 1945.

The ICP had no direct role in the Qasim coup of 1958 (although at one least one politburo member, Kamil 'Umar Nadhmi, was given advance notice by Qasim on 11Jul58), and although it was initially supportive of the new government, it was not invited to participate in it (although its prisoners were released in Aug). ICP was now a radical reformist rather than a revolutionary party, focusing under the leadership of Husayn al-Radi on working conditions and better service provision, and campaigning for democratic constitutional government; but it was strongly distrusted by the Iraqi political elite, and by Qasim himself. However, the ICP was the most extensive (and rapidly growing) political force in Iraq, building up support in Baghdad, S. Iraq and Kurdistan, with a membership of 25,000, and quickly gaining control over the students', women's (especially al-Rabita, the League for the Defence of Women's Rights, largely working on primary education of girls), youth & professional unions, broadcasting facilities, newspapers and courts over Dec58-Jan59: Qasim needed to accommodate it. It opposed the UAR's formation (especially given how its Syrian counterpart party had been dissolved on Syria's incorporation; it stood in opposition to Deputy PM 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif), holding a rally on 7 Aug 1958 for federalism rather than unity; and its support was drawn upon by Qasim in deposing 'Arif and vying with Nasir. The Mosul nationalist rebellion followed an ICP rally there on 6 March 1959 which had aimed to demonstrate its popularity in a known anti-Qasim town and forestall the anticipated revolt: the murder of Kamil Qazanchi led to large-scale ICP revenge attacks. The Ba'th formed alliances with elements in the military and conservative associations through which it persecuted ICP members. 500,000 demonstrated for stronger communist role in government on 1 May 1959; the ICP central committee made the decision not to attempt to seize power by force but to continue to press for free elections and the legalisation of the party; however Qasim appears to have decided to act against the ICP then. Qasim appointed only 1 ICP minister in a minor role from 13 July 1959 (Naziha al-Dulaimi, Iraq's first female minister, as Minister of Municipalities, until Nov 1960; 2 other ICP sympathisers also given minor ministerial posts). The Kirkuk riots of July 1959 were used by Qasim to discredit the ICP, blaming them publicly for the deaths: from 19Jul59-1961, the party was gradually marginalised: arrest of ICP members, dismissal of ICP-supporting army officers, shutting down of front organisations (Peace Partisans closed on 7May61) and press (Ittihad al-Sha'b fully closed on 1Oct60), dropping of ICP supports from cabinet (al-Dulaimi on 15Nov60). Was denied a license despite the passing of the 1Jan60 Law of Associations: a minor ICP splinter organisation was given a license in its place. Lost majority control over many of the trade unions over 1960-61, partly through the rigging of elections, partly through genuine loss of support. Its leaders were largely left untouched: Husayn al-Radi reorganised the party in Nov61, without 'Amr 'Abdullah, and the ICP issued a new journal, Tariq al-Sha'b, which has been in existence since Nov61.

During the Feb 1963 coup, the ICP fought for Qasim, but were disorganised. Its members were systematically targetted by the Ba'th afterwards - there is suspicion of extensive US involvement in this, with CIA thought to have provided the names & addresses of ICP members: 149 ICP members were officially executed over the next 6 months. Husayn al-Radi was captured on 20Feb, & killed on 24Feb; Jamal al-Haidari killed on 21Jul. Repression lessened after the Nov 1963 coup, especially as the USSR grew closer to Nasir, and Nasir to 'Arif; the ICP gave its support to pan-Arab unity , & Nasir's leadership of the movement, from the "August line" of Jul-Aug64. With 'Arif's break with Nasir in mid-65, opposition to 'Arif restarted, but the party finally split over the form that opposition to the 'Arifs' rule should take: 'Aziz al-Hajj led a rival Baghdad-based faction (which became known as the Central Command) from Sept67 that planned guerrilla attacks out of the southern marshes and began sabotage operations in Jan 1969 (its members were captured and al-Hajj publicly recanted). The ICP central committee, who retained majority support, did not actively pursue this line. Aziz Muhammad, a Kurdish tin worker (b.1933, Sulaymaniyya, imprisoned 1948-58, known as Nadhim 'Ali or Mu'in) took the position of first secretary from 1964: he was based in Moscow from Feb63 until his return to Iraq in Aug65.

After the July 1968 coup, the Ba'th surprisingly offered 3 ministerial posts to the ICP; but ICP made participation conditional upon full democratisation. The Ba'th declined, but continued negotiations with ICP leaders (and allowed some of its publications) whilst harassing (and in some cases assassinating) its activists. As the Ba'th built stronger links with East European countries, and proclaimed a National Action Charter of Nov 1971 which spoke of the need for an alliance with "progressive forces", the ICP began negotiations and publicly accepted participation in a National Progressive Front (NPF) government in April 1972 when treaty with Soviet Union was signed: ICP leaders 'Amir 'Abdallah and Mukarram Talabani appointed to cabinet on 15 May 1972, the NPF comes into operation in July 1973, the ICP is legalised for the 1st time, and it ceases criticism of the Ba'th government. Ba'th used the NPF to extend its control over mass organisations that had previously been dominated by the ICP, eg by creating "common lists" of candidates for organisational posts in which the Ba'thists held priority. The ICP's new freedom had brought considerable benefits: its newspaper, Tariq al-Sha'b, sold 6.7m copies in 1975. But with the Kurdish revolt crushed in 1975, the Ba'th decided it could dispense with ICP support, and began its repression of it. The ICP began from its May 1976 conference to call for more extensive democratisation. With escalating tension, the ICP began to openly criticise Ba'th policies on the Kurds in March 1978; in reply, the Ba'th began to apply the death penalty for soldiers engaged in ICP activity (12 soldiers sentenced to death in May 1978). The NPF was formally dissolved in March 1979 when the ICP left the Front, and it was proscribed.

The ICP gave support to Iran in the 1980-88 war. Was instrumental in creating the National Democratic Front (NDF), together with the KDP & KSPI on 28Nov80 (after the Damascus-based Democratic National Patriotic Front, estd 12Nov80, stalled over participation of the KDP), which had little role in the war; it became the Islamic National Front in Iraq when Hasan Naqib (see INM notes) and al-Da'wa joined it. Helped Syria coordinate the creation of the JAC (see INM below) from Dec 1990. Joined the IKF (see KDP, below) in 1992 (?). Had bases in northern Iraq, and participated in the May 1992 elections (winning 2.2% of the vote, the 5th largest). Its Kurdish branch renamed itself as the Kurdistan Communist Party in 1993: it was led by Karim Ahmad until April 2004, when he was succeeded by Kamal Shakir; other politburo members include Subhi Mehdi Ahmed, Abdul Rahman Faris and Ibrahim Sophi; its occasional newspaper is Regai, edited by Shaphol Fathi Kareem (with a separate paper, Kaldo Ashoor, for the Assyrian community); won 10% in Irbil municipal elections in 2002, and estimates that its membership is less than 5,000; based in Kalar. Many of its bases were routed in the August 1996 fighting; it retains offices in Shaqlawa and Sulaymaniyya. However, has good links with the main Kurdish groups; it has a front organisation, the Centre for Human Rights, based in the Kurdish Autonomous Region (releasing information largely on the mistreatment of prisoners). Member of the Coalition of Iraqi National Forces, launched on 23 June 2002 with a "National Action Charter", which commits the groups to the overthrow of Saddam Husayn without "foreign interference", the lifting of sanctions, the establishment of a democracy and the preservation of Iraq's unity; other major participants are the Da‘wa and the pro-Syrian Iraqi Ba‘th. Has stated its unwillingness to take part in the conference of opposition forces (to take place in Jan03) due to the "foreign interference" in Iraqi affairs. Was not invited to participate in the Apr03 US-convened meetings for the reconstruction of Iraq, but has a member in the Governing Council and interim cabinet. Supported a strong UN role in reconstruction. Its headquarters in Baghdad is in a former mukhabarat building on shari' Abu Nuass. Account of pre-election rally in Dec04 is here. Won 69,920 votes in the January 2005 elections (as part of the People's Unity slate, list 324), and thus two seats (for Hamid Majid Musa and Mufid Md Jawad) in the assembly.

Publications include the weekly periodical Tariq al-Sha'b, which was the first independent paper to be circulated in Baghdad after the fall of Saddam Husayn. Leaders include Hamid Majid Musa al-Bayati (separate biography here), Subhi al-Jumayli (representative in the UK), Ra'id Fahim (representative in Berlin?), 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Safi (Central Committee member), Bushra Purt, Adil Khalid (Central Committee member in Baghdad), Mufid Muhammad Jawad al-Jazairi (politburo member and interim minister for culture). There have been break-away factions, including the Advanced Cadre (led by politburo member Baqir Ibrahim al-Musawi). Website here.
Sources: Batatu (1978), Sluglett & Sluglett (1990).

Constitutional Monarchy Movement: led by Sharif Ali bin al-Husayn (b.1956), the cousin of the deposed and killed King Faisal II; was a banker based in Holland Park, London, who fled Iraq in 1958 via the Saudi embassy. Favours a constitutional monarchy with an elected government. Founded in 1993. Affiliated to INC, within which Sharif Ali is a member of the presidency council. Sa'd Saraf has a policy-making role within the CMM, and its spokesperson is Sadiq al-Musawi (who is head of the CMM's political office). Boycotted the follow-up committee's meeting in Salahuddin in Feb-Mar03, claiming that they had accepted a sectarian formula for the division of Iraqi opposition posts. It was not awarded representation on the Governing Council, and has since claimed that the Council does not have the trust of the Iraqi people (eg, at high profile conference in the Palestine Hotel, Sept03); has also criticised the deBaathification order. Opposed the limited nature of the handover of 28 June 2004. Stood as an independent list (349) in the January 2005 elections, winning 13740 votes, 0.16% of the vote, and did not qualify for any seats in the assembly. Website here; report here from 2005.

Democratic Centrist Tendency (DCT) / Independent Democrats Movement (IDM): Led by Adnan Pachachi (separate biography is here). The official spokesman was Ghassan al-Atiyyah, upon whom a Baghdad special court passed a death sentence in absentia in Sept00, on the grounds that he met with Israelis in a Cairo conference in Aug00; was later "disowned" by his tribe, Al Humaydat from the Shamiyah district. Husayn al-Sha'lan also has a role, and attended a meeting of the Free Iraq Council in Apr01. Close to Faysal al-Istrabadi, a lawyer based in Indiana, US, who had a major role in writing the interim constitution in Apr04. Was supported by the US as an alternative to the INC from the early 1990s; reemergence of interest in the DCT in Feb03, when Zalmay Khalilzad, the White House envoy, attempted to enlist Pachachi for a future Iraqi government, to sound him out possibly for a leadership role. In conjunction, Pachachi set up the Independent Democrats Movement in Feb03. Is still favoured by the State Department, but opposed by the Pentagon. Pachachi has declared his opposition to working with a US military governor in Iraq; the follow-up committee voted him onto their leadership council in an attempt to coopt him (2Mar03), a position he rejects (see his article of 2Mar). He supports a UN-administered transitional period, and is considered a liberal secular Arab nationalist. He vocally opposed the process of awarding out contracts to US firms after the ousting of the Ba'th regime. Pachachi returned to Iraq in early May03, and took a place in the Governing Council (and was a member of the rotating presidency). Stood as an independent list (170) in the January 2005 elections, winning 12728 votes, 0.15% of the vote, and did not qualify for any seats in the assembly. Website here; associated English version here. Daily newspaper is al-Nahda.

National Democratic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati): founded as a legal organisation on 2 April 1946 by Kamil al-Jadirji (Chadirchi), an Ahali-linked former minister in Hikmat Sulayman government (1936-37) who resigned in Jun37 over the lack of reforms; other founding leaders include Muhammad Hadid, a former leader of the Ahali group, and Husyan Jamil. Campaigned for liberal democracy, political reform, land reform, progressive taxation and workers' rights, with limited engagement with international issues (though it did organise protests against the Portsmouth treaty, 1948); was part of the national front of 1957 (see ICP notes). Joined a short-lived Nuri al-Sa'id government in Nov46. As communist parties were persecuted, a number of leftists joined the party; in response, Chadirchi urged the party to model itself on the British Labour Party, to distinguish itself from Marxists and radical nationalists. In 1947, it committed itself to "democratic socialism", and this became a public slogan from 1950, though it still opposed nationalisation of industry. Had good relations with 'Abd al-Karim al-Qasim: Muhammad Hadid was a key advisor to Qasim, and served as finance minister (Jul58-Apr60); 2 of its members were in his first cabinet (up to Feb59); 6 members or associates were in second cabinet (up to 1960). Was legalised on 9Feb60, in line with the Jan60 Law of Associations. Suffered from internal splits in May 1960 (when Hadid disagreed with Chadirchi taking the party into opposition; Hadid formed a separate pro-Qasim National Progressive Party in Jun60); and again in 1961, when Jamil also left the party over Chadichi's alliance with the ICP. The party went into decline thereafter, effectively ceasing to operate in Oct61, and was finally killed off by the Ba'th coups.

Reemerged after the removal of the Ba'th in 2003, under Nasir Jadirji (b.1933?), the son of Kamil and a lawyer, who had stayed in Baghdad, and who had set up an office in Mansur. His group, now sometimes known as the National Democratic Movement was made into a member of the "group of seven" on 7May03 to work with the US authorities (largely on account of being dominated by Sunnis with a secular liberal outlook). Jadirji became a member of the Governing Council, with 'Abd al-Amir Abbud Rahima as minister for agriculture. Other leaders include Hudayb al-Hajj Mahmud, Ihsam al-Bayati and Hasan al-Shaykh. Interview (May03) is here. Publishes the newspaper al-Ahali.

al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Call: Da‘wa means an invitation to believe in the true religion): Established over 1957-58, based on an association of Najaf 'ulama, a political-religious grouping that had been established on 12Oct57 to combat "atheism" (ie communism); seems to have taken on its name and structure at a meeting in Karbala' in the aftermath of the 14Jul58 revolution, though there are different accounts of its establishment. Although it is widely seen as a Twelver (Ithna 'Ashari) Shi'a organisation, it has always had Sunni members (around 10% in mid-1980s, according to its claims) and coordinated closely with Sunni Islamist groupings. A leading figure in the establishment of the grouping had been Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr (b.1931, Kazmiyya; cousin of Musa al-Sadr of Lebanon; trained in Najaf where he lived for the rest of his life), then a junior cleric, but later the highly influential author of 22 books including Falsafatuna (1958) and Iqtisaduna (1961), the latter being largely directed at communist theories. Sadr also outlined the system of Islamic government: an elected assembly is valid as in the absence of the Imam, man is khalifat Allah (vice-regent of God) = delegation of responsibility. The community (umma) must govern itself within the parameters of Islamic Law, as interpreted through the clergy: this is not rule by the 'ulama, but juristic supervision on the laws passed by the legislature = consultative (shura) rule. This was distinct from Khomeini's deistic (ilahi) form, portrayed in his 1970 Najaf lectures, who portrayed the jurisprudent (faqih) as having higher authority, with the 'ulama exercising the political authority of the Vanished Imam: hence the wilayat al-faqih, the guardianship of the jurisprudent. Sadr's Islamic polity would be a dawla fikriyya (a doctrinal state), held together by a creed. Sadr also supported a mixed economy, with oil resources remaining under the control of the State. Sadr is believed to have chaired the 1958 Karbala' meeting at which the organisation was formally established, and he wrote al-Da'wa's manifesto, al-Usus (the Fundamentals; later renamed Sawt al-Da'wa) in 1960.

al-Da'wa usually had the support of Muhsin al-Hakim (al-Tabataba'i) from Najaf, at whose house the 12Oct57 meeting seems to have been held. Hakim went onto become the marja' mutlaq (the most senior Shi‘a ayatollah) on the death of Ayatollah Husayn Brujerdi of Qom in 1961 (with the implicit support of the shah of Iran, eager to displace the rising Iranian Islamic movement), & had issued a fatwa on 12Feb60 proscribing membership of the ICP. His second son, Mahdi al-Hakim (b.1940), was a leading figure in the creation of al-Da'wa in 1958. Both Sadr and Muhsin al-Hakim distanced themselves from al-Da'wa over the 1960s, with Sadr and Muhsin al-Hakim's sons, Mahdi and Muhammad, leaving the party in 1961/2: it remains unclear to what extent this was due to an attempt to protect the party from repression or out of political differences.

al-Da'wa was strongest in Najaf-Karbala region, and developed a strongly anti-secular revolutionary agenda through its study circles, which were mostly comprised of students and middle class professionals, working with young reformist mujtahids. The main leaders in establishing the organisation were Talib Rifa'i (a Najafi businessman though also a cleric, b.1930? later relocated to the US) and Sahib al-Dakhil (a Najafi cereal merchant, b.1932 and executed in 1972; initiator of the failed Ja'fari party in Najaf in 1952; the formal leader of al-Da'wa in the 1960s; extended biog in Jabar, pp.101, 107-8); also Mahdi al-Hakim, Muhammad Sadiq Qamusi (a Najafi linen merchant, b.1930?), Murtada al-'Askari (a Najafi cleric of Iranian origin, b.1915/19?, left party in the mid60s), Salih al-Adib (a Karbala' agricultural engineer, 1930?-1996, based in Tehran in later life), Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum (see below) and Muhammad Hadi Subayti (a Najafi civil engineer). al-Da'wa believed that the first phase, al-marhala al-fikriyya (the phase of ideas; later renamed al-marhala al-taghyiriyya, the phase of change), was in tranforming popular consciousness; only when the intellectual struggle was won could the political phase (al-marhala al-siyasiyya) begin, to be followed by al-marhala al-thawriyya (the revolutionary phase; removing the unIslamic elite) and al-marhala al-hukmiyya (the phase of Islamic rule) > emphasis on education, esp through newspaper, Sawt al-Da'wa. There was little reference to Shi'i particularity in any of al-Da'wa's early doctrinal texts, instead conceiving the Islamic nation as a whole; however, this may have changed somewhat during Sahib al-Dakhil's leadership of the party from the early 1960s, who was heavily concerned with defending group interests and Shi'a identity in opposition to the narrow sectarian approach of the 'Arif regime (Jabar, pp.137-41).

The Society of Religious Scholars in Najaf, Jama'at al-'Ulama' (estd 1959, with formal status from 1960; membership here), more openly aligned with Hakim, had some personnel links to al-Da'wa. It established welfare institutions and schools from 1960; the Jama'at also produced a monthly review, al-Adhwa' (the first editions of which were edited by Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr), a magazine, al-Risala, and a large number of books. Its purpose was the reassertion of Shi'i values in opposition to communism.

The context to al-Da'wa's formation was the low level of Shi'a participation in major religious rituals (unprecedently low turn out at the Marad al-Ras pilgrimage to Karbala' & Najaf in 1959), cf huge level of participation in communist demonstrations. It took a consistently anti-communist stance: it strongly opposed Qasim's land reform (which caused a decline in tribal shaykhs' income, hence also the religious taxes to the clerics) and his equalisation of female rights in inheritance law (1958-59); and 'Arif's nationalisation measures (1964). Hakim also was strongly critical of the ‘Arif rulers' alliance with Nasir, and refused to issue a fatwa permitted the war against the Kurds (1963; some claim he issued a fatwa in 1966 forbidding this participation, but this is unclear). The other context was the traditionalists' quietism, some of whom argued that there was a religious prohibition on political engagement until the return of the Hidden Imam; the Najafi hawza as the religious authority provided the sole legitimate public voice. al-Da'wa did however accept that the party must have a faqih in a leadership role.

After Muhsin al-Hakim refused to condemn the shah over Shatt al-Arab dispute in 1969, the Ba'th regime began overt persecution: the project to establish Kufa University, backed by Hakim, was suspended and the funds confiscated; up to 40,000 Shi'is were deported under the designation of being Iranian, in an attempt to cause economic problems for Iran; the exemption of religious students from military service was revoked; and trade controls impacted heavily on Shi'a merchants. Hakim's second son, Hujja Mahdi, was arrested and allegedly tortured. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Badri, a Sunni ‘alim and leader of Hizb al-Tahrir who spoke in favour of Mahdi, was killed under torture - a Sunni is thus seen as the first martyr. Hakim began a public critique of the government's oppression of Shi'a religious leaders and practices, and may have forbidden membership of the Ba'th party. Mahdi al-Hakim later fled to Pakistan and there onto London, where he founded the Ahl al-Bayt charitable society in 1980, with the help of Jama'at al-'Ulama'; assassinated in Khartum in Jan 1988. Khomeini, urging stronger engagement, used this dispute as the backdrop to his Najaf lectures of 21Jan-8Feb70 advocating "Islamic government", wilayat al-faqih and criticising inactive 'ulama.

Muhsin al-Hakim died on 2Jun70. With Muhsin al-Hakim's death, Shi'a political allegiance transferred to Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim (see SCIRI notes below); religious allegiance was with Ayatollahs Abu al-Qasim Khu'i (a quietist) and Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr (now an Ayatollah, the only Arab of the 8 living Shi'a maraji'). Persecution of al-Da'wa became esp intense from 28Sept71, with the arrest and execution of Sahib al-Dakhil; and the brief arrest of Sadr in 1972. 5 of al-Da'wa's leaders (including Shaykh 'Arif al-Basri, b.1937 in Basra, an early leader of al-Da'wa who coordinated activities in Baghdad) were executed in December 1974.

From 1975, the Ba'th government had banned the annual procession from Najaf to Karbala (Marad al-Ras, or the Arba'in Visitation). Najafi activists, predominantly from among the traditional bodies that organised the processions rather than al-Da'wa members, organised a procession from Najaf to Karbala in Feb 1977 in response, which was attacked by the police; they then organised the protests (the Safar intifada) among the Shi‘a of southern Iraq in response to the attacks. Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim was subsequently arrested (along with 30,000 others), and became a main Shi'a opposition leader on his release in 1979. Strongly supported the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and many of its leaders had strong personal ties with Ayatollah Khomeini (especially Sadr, who declared a 3 day holiday at the Najaf hawza from 11Feb79). Sadr, to whom his followers were increasingly openly pledging allegiance (the "Mubaya'a movement"), was place under house arrested from 12Jun79, and denied contact with the outside world. Were intensely repressed through 1979, inc arrest of 4000-5000 Da'wa activists and the killing of 200-300, as Islamist leaders came to call openly for violent protest and revolutionary tactics: eg, the attempts by Da'wa members to assassinate Saddam Husayn: Dr Ghazi al-Hariri in Aug79, by bombing Karama hospital in Baghdad; airman Ghalib Ibrahim Tahrir on 6Jun80, by shelling an air force reviewing stand. al-Da'wa formed a military wing (subsequently called Shahid al-Sadr force) in late79. This era was later proclaimed the beginning of the political stage of Islamic activism. Membership of al-Da'wa was made punishable by death on 30Mar80 (96 members reportedly executed in that month). Claimed responsibility for the 1 April 1980 attempted assassination of Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy PM, in Baghdad, in revenge for the execution of its members. In reprisal, Sadr and his sister Bint al-Huda (Amina al-Sadr; a respected 'alima who organised study circles for young women) were executed on 8/9 April 1980 > Sadr has portrayed by his followers as the "Fourth Martyr" of Shi'ism. Was explicitly blamed by Iraqi regime for actions which necessitated the attack on Iran. Da'wa members mostly either joined Iranian military units or refrained from political activity; Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim left for Iran shortly after the commencement of the war. However, took part in the Damascus-based National Democratic Front (see ICP notes), which became the Islamic National Front in Iraq on its accession to it. Its members staged a major assassination attempt on Saddam Husayn in Jul82 in Dujayl (approx.150 killed during fighting); bombed the Ministry of Planning on 1Aug82; and attacked Saddam Husayn's motorcade in Mosul on 9Apr87.

Was predominantly based in Tehran from 1980 until the ousting of the Ba'th regime, and supporting the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. Since 1982, it has viewed SCIRI with some suspicion, due to its more close alignment with the Iranian govt, preferring to keep an independent standpoint. Unlike SCIRI, and in line with Sadr's teachings, it has never collectively endorsed the notion of wilayat al-faqih for the future government of Iraq (a prominent leader, Murtada al-'Askari, has criticised the notion; other Da'wa members accept it), indicating their greater independence from the Iranian line. The more pro-Iranian jurisprudent of al-Da'wa, Kazim Husayni Ha'iri (from Najaf but exiled in Qom) also left the party in 1987 or 1988: he claimed that the faqih should have a direct decision-making role within the party, and that the Iranian state should have authority over the Shi'is as a whole; the party leadership opposed this, as Ha'iri with his supporters began to call themselves al-Da'wa Jurisprudent Council (which went onto back the Sadr II movement: see Sadr II notes below): this group remained in Iran where Ha'iri was influential among remaining al-Da'wa members. Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi, al-Da'wa's Sec-Gen in Iran, continued to argue a pro-Iranian line until he was forced to resign in 2000. A number of al-Da'wa members who opposed the notion of wilayat al-faqih, largely intellectuals, also began to organise independently, with a base in Damascus, and came to call themselves Kawadir Hizb al-Da'wa (the Da'wa party cadres). Many of its members also left Iran after 1988 for the West, so as to build up a more independent organisation. One result was that there was a fracturing of the movement, with Syrian, Iranian, Iraqi and London branches emerging as competing centres.

After the 1991 war, al-Da'wa took a leading role in the JAC meetings (see INM below), and it provided the chair for the Beirut assembly in Mar91, Jawad al-Maliki (a Damascus-based engineer, from Tuwayrij). Did not participate in Vienna INC founding, and criticised the Kurdish position at the conference for being secessionist. Took part in the Oct92 INC opposition assembly at Salahuddin, and expressed reservations about the decision that the future Iraqi government would be federal in form; pulled out of the INC in 1995. Some analysts claim that in the 1990s its London, Iraq and Iran branches have worked relatively independently, with the Iraqi Da'wa, based in Basra and calling itself Tanzim al-Da'wa, looking primarily to Husayn Fadlallah for leadership, and rejecting the principle of wilayat al-faqih. Its London branch, which was dominated by lay members, signed the organisation up as a member of the Coalition of Iraqi National Forces (see ICP entry). It only started contacts with the US on 14Oct02, with three successive meetings in London between State Dept officials and al-Da'wa team, led by Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, the London spokesman of al-Da'wa. Did not take part in the Dec02 London meetings, though Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum, a leader of Ahl al-Bayt, took a place on the follow-up committee. Ibrahim al-Ja'fari also held a meeting with Zalmay Khalilzad, President Bush's special envoy for the Iraqi opposition, in early Jan03; Khalilzad has reportedly offered al-Da'wa five seats on the opposition follow-up and arrangement committee. al-Da'wa continued to refuse participation, including in the Nasiriya meeting of 15 April to plan a post-Saddam Iraq; Da'wa seems to have had a significant role in organising the demonstrations there against Jay Garner on that day. However, was made into a member of the "group of seven" on 7May03 to work with the US authorities, and has 2 members on the Governing Council. Its formerly exiled leaders, including Muhammad Bakr al-Nasri (a prominent cleric, possibly the main religious leader in the party), now seem to be returning to Iraq, especially to Nasiriya which it largely controls. Set up headquarters in Baghdad in the Sindbad youth centre.

Spokesperson of al-Da'wa (formerly of London branch, now in Baghdad) is Ibrahim Ja‘fari al-Ushayqir (separate biography here). Other prominent members include Abu Bilal 'Adil al-Adib (member of the Political Bureau of the Tehran branch, a teacher from Karbala), 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Kadhami, Dr Haydar al-Abadi (was interim minister of communications), Dr Haydar Abbas (London representative), Muhammad Bakr al-Nasri. The Iraqi branch seems to be led by 'Abd al-Karim al-'Anzi.

Website here; a small breakaway faction controls this website. Its weekly newspaper is al-Jihad. Other sources include Faleh A. Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq (2003); Wiley, Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi'as (1992); articles in Faleh Abdul-Jabar, ed., Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues (2002); Cole, "The Iraqi Shiites".

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, al-Majlis al-A‘la lil-Thawra al-Islamiyya fil-‘Iraq): the most prominent Shi‘a political grouping, with its main constituency in Southern Iraq and its base in Tehran. Was established on 17 November 1982 with the support of Iran (and during intense persecution of al-Da'wa), and was led by Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim (b.1939/1944? in Najaf, the 6th son of Muhsin al-Hakim; leading role in the 1977 Safar intifada; imprisoned in 1972, 1977 and 1979, fleeing to Iran on his release in 1980; biography from SCIRI here; interviews here from Dec01 and Oct02: 1,2). Hakim was officially the "speaker" until 1986, when he became chairman, a position he retained until his death. A central committee with 15 or 16 members has always been the chief body, which incorporates representatives from Kurdish Hizbullah (Muhammad Khalid Barzani, made up largely of Barzanis who stayed in Iran after the 1975 defeat) and the Islamic Task Organisation (Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi). Hakim was named by Ayatollah Khomeini as the head of an Islamic Republic of Iraq. From its inception, it has purported to represent all the Muslims of Iraq (including the Sunnis), and has portrayed Iran as the foundation of the World Islamic Revolution; it has been the only major Iraqi Islamist group to support the notion of the wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent) in the future Iraqi system of government, with the same faqih as Iran (but with a separate legislature). They had also taken on Khomeini's rhetoric of anti-imperialism, with Hakim presenting the struggle in 1982 as between Islam and imperialism, with imperialism represented by the (US/SU-supported) Ba'th regime.

SCIRI was created to act as a provisional government for Basra in the event of its capture. Its initial military force was named Liwa' al-Sadr (al-Sadr regiment), which became Faylaq Badr (the Badr corps). Its first major action was when approx.200 of its members secured the village of Haj Umran near Sulaymaniyya in 1983. It is recruited largely from Iraqi Shi'a prisoners ("penitents" = tawabin) captured by Iran during the 1980-8 war (Hakim had been given the role of coordinating family visits to Iraqi POWs, and SCIRI was part of the special committee created in 1987 on Iraqi POWs in Iran), and was initially under the command of an Iranian colonel. SCIRI members, through front organisation al-Mujahidin, also conducted attacks on Kuwait, due to its support for Iraq: attacked the US embassy in Dec83 and attempted to assassinate the amir of Kuwait in Apr85. SCIRI's executive director, Abu Thar al-Hasan, died in Jan88 of the chemical wounds he received from an Iraqi attack on Hajj Umran in Nov87. Opposed the US-led war in 1991, claiming the invasion of Kuwait was a pretext for aggression against the Iraqi people; called on Iraqis to confront foreign aggression. Remains close to the conservative establishment in Iran, especially Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i; Iran's head of judiciary since Aug99, Ayatollah Mahmud Shahrudi (who is of Iraqi origin), was a leading member of SCIRI in its early years. Reportedly declined participation in the INC's 3-man presidential council from Oct92, claiming that Shi'a representation should be more than 1 in 3. Took seats in the executive council however, although participation was severely limited from 1994; suspended participation in the INC from 1999.

Estimates of SCIRI's present strength vary: the CPA estimated (Jun04) that Badr corps had 16,500 active fighters. Most estimates had placed it at about 10,000 guerrillas in total. It had made claims to having 8000 operating inside south/central Iraq prior to the ousting of the Ba'th (including the Badr corps, operating out of Iran; later reports from Jan03 put the strength of the Badr Brigades at 10-12,000, with a leader claiming it has three sectors) and once claimed to have 70,000 fighters in 2 training camps in Sulaymaniyya. Was selected by the US for funding through the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, an offer which it refused. In Dec01, seemed to welcome outside military intervention to topple Saddam, and supported a 1-year transitional government followed by elections; however, from early 2002 (and Bush's inclusion of Iran within the "axis of evil"), voiced opposition (Feb, Mar, Jun) to a US invasion of Iraq, arguing that this would cause unnecessary suffering & lead to a US occupation of the country. However, with Iranian permission, continues contacts with US, with a delegation headed by 'Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (head of SCIRI's military wing and then deputy leader; Muhammad Baqr's younger brother; interview here) attending the Washington meeting on 9Aug02; continued to oppose US military action after the meeting, but agreed to cooperation militarily with the KDP in Sept02 (see KDP notes); from late Oct02, was indicating that US assistance might be welcome in overthrowing Saddam, as long as the US does not have a role in establishing a post-Saddam government (1,2,3): possibly could be interpreted as requesting US protection (esp from fear of Iraq's readiness to use non-conventional weapons on insurgents) rather than US intervention. Has been ambiguous in its support for a federal Iraq, giving the concept formal support whilst speaking of popular acceptance as a necessary precondition. Participated in "Group of 4" meetings (with INA, PUK & KDP) to coordinate opposition outside the framework of the INC; and established its dominance at the London conference of December 2002, reflected in the scale of its representation on the follow-up committee. Seemed to have come to coordinate more closely with the INC, with Hakim holding a meeting with Chalabi in Tehran on 9Dec02. However, problems arose in Jan03, when the US made it clear that it envisaged a longer term military occupation of Iraq; this was denounced by SCIRI. Reportedly moved a large number of its troops (up to 5000) into northern Iraq in mid-Feb03, to prepare for a US assault on Iraq, despite US warnings.

During the US invasion, SCIRI urged its followers not to oppose the US forces, but to remain neutral, and for the UN to take over the administration of Iraq; however, as the plans to install a new administration in Iraq became clear, it has become more vocal in opposing US measures: it boycotted the Nasiriya meeting of 15 April to plan a post-Saddam Iraq, and the Badr brigade has taken control of towns near the Iranian border (eg Baqubah); it sent a low-level delegation to the Baghdad meeting of 28Apr. Its main base is now Kut, where 'Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has been based since 16Apr; SCIRI has installed Sayyid Abbas (b.1951?) as mayor, despite US opposition and attempts to evict him from the mayor's mansion. SCIRI now strongly supports the end to the US military presence in Iraq immediately, and argues that an Islamic republic will be installed through the majority support of the people after an intermediate stage. In early May, Iranian newspapers reported that Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim was considering relinquishing the leadership to 'Abd al-Aziz, in order to become the spiritual figurehead. On 10May, Muhammad Baqr crossed over to Basra, where he rallied huge crowds there, in al-Nasiriya and Samawa, before returning to Najaf, calling for a withdrawal of US forces and the establishment of an Islamist state, but disavowing the use of force to achieve this. Other SCIRI spokespersons describe the goal not as a theocracy but as a state in which religion plays a significant role (eg Bayan Jabr, May03; Hamid al-Bayati, May03). The Badr brigades seem to have only given up their heavy weapons in the amnesty, and the US has made forcible attempts to disarm them of other weapons by taking over SCIRI offices (eg, in al-Jadiriya, Baghdad on 21Jun, Wasit and Kut on c.23Jun). Nevertheless, SCIRI has continued to condemn attacks on US forces (eg sermon of Muhammad Baqr on 27Jun), and accepted a place on the Governing Council for 'Abd al-Aziz. Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim was assassinated in the Najaf bombing of 29 August 2003; 'Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has taken over leadership, with some viewing his son, Muhsin, as likely to take over his role in the Governing Council. An assassination attempt on 'Abd al-Aziz on 21Nov03 in a Baghdad mosque failed as the rocket did not explode. There was a bomb attack on the Badr brigades' headquarters in Baghdad on 19Dec03

Other leaders of SCIRI include Hamid al-Bayati (spokesperson, based in London, rep to the UK since 1992; interview of May03), Muhammad al-Haydari (head of the Political Bureau), Ibrahim Hammudi (Hakim's political advisor), Bayan Baqr Solagh (ie Bayan Jabr; Damascus rep, and head of Arab & international affairs; has coordinated with US since 1993), Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi (president of SCIRI, also supported by them in May04 for the position of Iraqi prime minister), Ali Ha'iri (president of the general assembly), Muhammad Ali Rahmani (commander of exile mobilization), Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi, 'Abd al-Rahim al-Shawki, Muhammad Hariri (representative in Lebanon), Hajj Abu Zaid, Abu Islam al-Saqir (spokesman), Warith al-Kindi (information officer). It has offices in northern Iraq, Syria, the UK (West Kensington), France, Austria and Germany as well as Iran. It opened an office in Washington in late 2002. Website here; older version here. Its regular newspaper is al-'Adalah (issued three times a week in 2004); also has an occasional newspaper, Nida'a al-Rafidayn.

Islamic Task Organisation (Munazzamat al-'Amal al-Islami; often referred to as the Islamic Action Organisation): grouping formed by the 'ulama of Karbala after withdrawing from the early meetings of al-Da'wa in 1960/1. The "task" of the group's name is the formation of Islamic government. Main early leaders participated in the early meetings of al-Da'wa in 1958-59: esp Ayatollah Hasan Shirazi (b.Najaf, but grew up in Karbala; exiled in 1970 and assassinated in Beirut in 1980) and his elder brother, Muhammad Hussein Shirazi (left for Kuwait in late60s/early70s). They agreed with al-Da'wa on the need for a politically active 'ulama, but opposed their seeming innovation in adopting the idea of a political party, which Hasan Shirazi dismissed as a Western concept. Instead, they stressed the need for a religious authority (ie, a faqih) leading the organisation, whom followers seek to emulate = the traditionalist Islamic form. Found some institutional form at this stage, eg Muhammad Shirazi's Islamic Charity Society (estd 1962), but largely organised around the Shirazi family.

From 1968, the grouping was largely organised by the Shirazis' nephews Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi (b.1945, Karbala; biog here) and Hadi al-Mudarrisi, who turned it into a more formal political movement, calling it al-Haraka. Muhsin al-Husayni (b.1944, another Karbala cleric), also had a key role in the grouping, becoming deputy leader (although he later left to lead a splinter group). Developed good relations with Muhammad Muntaziri, future Iranian deputy leader then in Lebanon; the nascent Amal movement in Lebanon, and Palestinian Fatah. Like al-Da'wa radicalised in favour of military measures in 1979, when it took on its present name. Its most famous action was the attempt by a member, Samir Nur 'Ali, to assassinate Deputy PM Tariq Aziz, on 1Apr80. Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi served as leader, and was coopted onto the central committee of SCIRI from its inception in Nov82. The ITO continued independent actions, eg attack on Baghdad nightclub and hotel in Jan89; based in Iran. Has managed to find recruits in Arab Gulf States (was blamed by Bahrain for Aug79 demonstrations), but its base remains Karbala. It coordinates closely with Iran and Syria, and had an active role in the 1991 uprising. Pre-2003, operational leadership seemed to rest with Ridha Jawad Taqi (b.1955, a Karbala chemical engineer, residing in London) and Ibrahim al-Mutairi (a Karbala agricultural engineer).

60 members, including the leadership, returned to Karbala on 22Apr03; and many (inc Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi) were briefly detained by US forces (reportedly after being captured by the Mujahidin i-Khalq). Mudarrisi has since called for a pluralistic government in Iraq that respects minority rights, and opposes attacks on US forces; but that he opposes federalism on ethnic lines. Remains a cautious supporter of the Governing Council, despite not having a place on it.
Sources as for al-Da'wa.

Jamaat al-Sadr al-Thani (the Sadr II Movement): emerged on 7-8 April 2003, just prior to the ousting of the Ba'th regime from Baghdad, to take effective control of large urban areas of Iraq, including the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. It is led by Muqtada al-Sadr (b.1974 according to him, though this is disputed; holds the rank of Hojatoleslam; interviews: 7May03), the son of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (b.23Mar43, a cousin of Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr), who was prayer leader at the Imam Ali Mosque, a follower of Shi'i mysticism and supporter of the wilayat al-faqih from the 1990s; recognised as a Grand Ayatollah in 1992. Developed a distinction between the "silent jurisprudent" (ie a quietist, implicitly upholding an unjust status quo) and the "speaking jurisprudent", which caused a fracturing within the Najaf religious establishment. Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr was assassinated (allegedly on Uday's orders), together with 2 of his sons (Mustafa and Mu'ammal), on 19 Feb 1999 soon after publicly criticising the regime's restrictions on Shi'a worship, and allegedly meeting members of the SCIRI Badr Corps. After the killings, Muqtada stayed in the country and attempted to mobilise the Shi'a community on the basis of his father's teachings; he is highly critical of those who either were outside the country (eg SCIRI's leadership, INC) or were quiescent (eg Sistani).

Strongly opposed to a continued US presence in Iraq, refusing to participate in Nasiriya meeting of 28Apr03 or take a role in the Governing Council. The Sadr Movement has renamed Saddam City as Sadr City, and it now largely controls that suburb (reportedly driving out the Badr Corps on 17Apr03), basing itself in al-Muhsin mosque; it is also strong in Najaf, Kufa and the Shi'a quarter of Samarra'. Reportedly a third of Basra city council has aligned itself with Muqtada. On 13Apr03 it temporarily surrounded the homes of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani (from Mashhad, Iran; head of Hawza al-Ilmiya, the highest seat of learning in Najaf, and a marja') and Ayatollah Sa'id al-Hakim (nephew of Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim), ordering them to leave Najaf; it may also have had a role in the murder of 'Abd al-Majid al-Khu'i on 10Apr03. Sadr's relations with al-Da'wa and Jafar al-Sadr (son of Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr) are unclear.

Spokesman is Shaykh Adnan al-Shahmani. Sadr visited Iran c.7Jun03 to improve relations (he had been initially critical of Iranian attempts to control Shi'a religious offices). Sadr has said (27Jun03) that leadership of Iraqi Shi'i society should rest with Iraqis, and that those of Iranian extraction in Najaf (the Hawza establishment) should not have a political role; accepted the wilayat al-faqih, but the supreme jurisprudent should be different in Iraq from Iran. On 18Jul, Sadr denounced the Governing Council as "infidels", calling for the establishment of a shadow Islamic government and announcing the creation of "Mahdi's army". Began to operate a network of courts and private prisons, as well as mobilising armed followers through late 2003. Also took on a role in imposing puritanism: it demolished the village of Kawali, near Diwaniyya, on 12Mar04 on account of its "debauchery".

Has promoted Ayatollah Kazim Husayni Ha'iri, from Najaf but exiled in Qom, to be the head of the Hawza instead (he had been appointed by Muhammad Sadiq as his successor); Ha'iri supports the wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent), and has good relations with al-Da'wa and SCIRI too. Shaykh Muhammad al-Fartusi, from Najaf, says he was sent by Ha'iri to east Baghdad, and seems to be aligned with Sadr. However, by Jul03, Ha'iri seems to be promoting a breakaway faction under Shaykh Muhammad Ya'qubi of Najaf, calling itself al-Fadilah (formally estd 16Jul).

Sadr stepped up his calls for a US withdrawal from Mar04, particularly after the Transitional Administrative Law was issued; in response, the CPA closed down his weekly newspaper, al-Hawza on 29Mar, for 2 months; this resulted in ten of thousands joining demonstrations in favour of Sadr. After the head of Sadr's Najaf office, Mustafa Ya'qubi, was arrested on 3Apr, began to take over police stations and government buildings in Kufa, Najaf and parts of Baghdad. After extensive fighting, a ceasefire was organised in June; Sadr announced his intentions to disband the militia; and the ban on al-Hawza was lifted on 19 July.

More extensive history is Cole in Middle East Journal, vol.57/4 (Autumn 2003).

Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP, al-Hizb al-Islami al-'Iraqi): The main Sunni Islamist party, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Estd in the late 1950s and declared legal by the court of appeal on 26Apr60, the only religious party permitted under Qasim's rule. Originally led by 'Abd Allah al-Nu'man, a religious leader from Mosul; 'Abd al-Rahman Sayyid Mahmud became leader in 1958, succeeded by Ibrahim Abdullah Shihab and from March 1960 by Nu'man 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Samarra'i, a teacher from Samarra'. It had close ties to Shi'a Islamic groupings, especially those around Muhsin al-Hakim. Published the newspaper al-Hiyad. Was essentially closed down from late60 when it criticised some of the legislation of Qasim for being contrary to the shari'a in a memo of 15Nov60; its leaders were detained for 5 months, and the party remained suspended on their release, as the leadership refused to change to a public association as Qasim demanded. Thereafter, worked clandestinely in low-key ways: sought to avoid provoking the regime after 30Jul68. Former leaders of the IIP met in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, & agreed to revive it, base itself in the UK & produce a newsletter, Dar al-Salaam. Sec-Gen is Muhsin 'Abd al-Hamid (separate biography here). Other leaders include Iyad al-Samarra'i (an engineer, appointed to the Follow-Up Committee in Dec 02), Fuad al-Rawi (member of the Political Committee), 'Usama al-Tikriti (a physician), Faruq al-'Ani (an engineer), Basim al-'Adhami (a lawyer), Hashim Hasani (who deputised on the Governing Council). Opposed the 2003 war, but had taken a role in coordinating with opposition groups.

Has emerged after the fall of the Ba'th in 2003 as a considerable force; accepted a place on the Governing Council, with Muhsin 'Abd al-Hamid also serving as a rotating president. However, has come under frequent attack from Sunni insurgents particularly from early 2004; its deputy head responsible for media relations, Qahdan Kazim al-Rubay'i, was assassinated on 30 May 2004 in Mahmudiyya. Its headquarters in Baghdad were severely damaged in a bomb attack of 11Jul04. It tried to take a mediating role in the Falluja crisis of April 2004, and has become increasingly critical of the presence of US forces in Iraq. Its radio station is Dar al-Salaam. Website here.