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"Not
taking "yes" for an answer" When the Prime Minister was touring the Middle East in October last year to drum up support for the war on Afghanistan, he was unequivocal on one point. After Blair held talks with Sultan Qaboos, the ruler of Oman, a senior British official told journalists there would be no steps taken against Iraq unless there was "absolute evidence" of Iraq's complicity in the events of 11th September. Those who attended the meeting, including the BBC political editor, reporters from the Guardian and the Independent, and the Reuters correspondent, all came to the view that Blair was attempting to reassure the Arab world of the limited aims of the "war against terror". The message was that the Arab countries could endorse or acquiesce in the war against Afghanistan without fearing a new regional conflagration. Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon emphasised the point at a London press conference later that month: "There is no hidden agenda; this is not a prelude to a wider war. Our objectives are linked to the events of 11th September ... there is no evidence linking Iraq to the events of 11th September; there is no evidence either so far that links Iraq to the anthrax attacks in the United States. It’s important that we emphasise those things." The about-turn in the government's position, with tacit though substantial support now for US plans to invade Iraq, amounts to more than Blair’s willingness to be blown whichever way the wind from across the Atlantic sends him. It demonstrates the loss of Britain's credibility as an independent actor in the diplomatic world. On 22nd August, Jack Straw flickered back into life to tell the BBC that the prospects for an invasion of Iraq would "recede" if Iraq readmitted weapons inspectors. Even if Straw had ruled out British participation in an invasion if weapons inspectors were admitted - which he did not do - it would be difficult to take him seriously, given how easily British ministers have switched position on Iraq whenever US leaders lay down the line. In fact the Bush administration has abandoned all effort to induce the Iraqi government to allow weapons inspections. During August, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice joined the president and vice-president in asserting that renewed inspections would not be sufficient to alter the aim of toppling the Iraqi leadership. Most explicit in this regard was John Bolton, US under-secretary for arms control, who told the BBC on 3rd August: "Our policy ... insists on regime change in Baghdad and that policy will not be altered, whether inspectors go in or not." In contrast to British statements that Iraq should implement Security Council resolutions, Bolton has gone on record - in an article entitled "Is There Really ‘Law’ in International Affairs?" - to claim that international law is a malicious figment of the academic imagination, harmful to the pursuit of national interests, and best ignored. He presumably believes that Security Council resolutions - effective only due to a particular legal treaty, the United Nations Charter - are also best brushed aside when inconvenient. Hans Blix, the current head of the weapons inspectorate (Unmovic), said on 18th August that, "if the Iraqis conclude that an invasion by someone is inevitable then they might conclude that it's not very meaningful to have inspections." It even has a clear disincentive if it believes that the weapons inspectors will - like their predecessors in Unscom - collect information that the US government would use to plot its overthrow or provoke crises that will be used to justify the bombing of Iraq. That Unscom was engaged in such actions is now beyond doubt. Its executive director from 1991 to 1997, Rolf Ekéus, said on Swedish radio at the end of July that the US tried to gather information about Iraq's security services, its conventional military capacity and even the location of Saddam Hussein through the supposedly impartial weapons inspections programme. It is not hard to guess why the US wanted such information. Given this, Iraq has tried to obtain assurances from the UN that the readmittance of inspectors would be linked to an end to the US agenda of "regime change". It put a series of questions, some of which were on this theme, to the UN Security Council in March this year. A US spokesman dismissed these questions as a "distraction" and the US mission at the UN blocked the Security Council from making a reply. Since March, Iraq has also been making offers to allow inspections by experts from the US and UK. None of these offers have met the UN standard for unlimited and unimpeded access, and have been rejected for that reason by the UK. However, it could be more relevant to consider how such inspections could help uncover Iraq's non-conventional weapons, if fears about these are genuine. |
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Author: Glen Rangwala Back to the Index of Writings |
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