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"US
raises the hurdles" Glen Rangwala looks behind the cynical attempts of the US and Britain to make war inevitable. On 15th September, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told BBC Television that, if the Iraqi regime re-admits weapons inspectors to Iraq, "the case for military action recedes to the point almost of invisibility". On 16 September - the very day after Jack Straw had made his statement - Iraq's Foreign Ministry issued its most unambiguous statement up to that date of its willingness to let inspectors back in. Naji Sabri, Iraq's Foreign Minister, wrote to the UN Secretary-General that: "I am pleased to inform you of the decision of the Government of the Republic of Iraq to allow the return of United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions." Caught off-guard, the British government waited for Washington's response. Jack Straw receded to the point almost of invisibility, but it turned out that the case for military action did not: now it turned out that Iraq's compliance with existing United Nations resolutions was insufficient to avoid the destruction of the country. Instead, a whole new range of demands would be made of Iraq. Mere subservience was no longer enough since total subjugation was now required. George Bush has made it clear that he would like the new demands to be expressed in a new Security Council resolution. He has also made it clear that if the Security Council does not accept those demands, then the US will move straight to military action. There are two types of demands in the draft resolution put by the US to the Security Council. Firstly, there is a statement that if Iraq does not comply with the terms of the resolution, any country - meaning the US - can resort to war. There is no need for a UN statement that Iraq is not complying: it is left up to individual countries to be both judge and executioner. This is the part of the draft that has attracted the most international comment, with France presenting a counter-draft that changed only this element of the US version. According to the French text, the UN would have to determine that Iraq is not in full compliance with the resolution before military force is authorised. However, the most significant element of the draft resolution is the new demands that are made of Iraq. Strikingly, the resolution dispenses with all the past agreements reached between the UN and Iraq to govern the inspections regime. The draft resolution brushes aside the Memorandum of Understanding reached between the UN Secretary-General and Iraq in February 1998 over the procedures for the inspection of eight "Presidential sites". These procedures meant that inspectors had to be accompanied by diplomats and limited advance notice was required. The only attempt by weapons inspectors to inspect these sites, in March to April 1998 was completed successfully: the UN Security Council welcomed Iraq's cooperation in a statement of 14 May 1998. Jack Straw has reappeared in recent weeks to argue that the agreements in place between Iraq and the UN were unacceptable. Perhaps he should remember his leader's own words of the time. Immediately after the Memorandum of Understanding was concluded, Blair announced: "This is precisely what we've been asking for" (quoted in the Washington Post, "Clinton Endorses Iraq Deal", 24 February 1998). Welcoming the deal in the House of Commons on 24 February, he said that he was "delighted" and that "We need to embody the agreement in a new Security Council resolution". This is exactly what happened: the Security Council endorsed the deal through a resolution six days later. The new draft supported by the British government therefore undermines the very UN resolutions that it claims to be acting in order to uphold. It goes much further: a string of demands are made of Iraq that it knows that Iraq could never consent to. Weapons inspectors would have the right not only to interview whoever they liked in Iraq, but also to remove whoever they choose along with their families from the country. From the text of the draft resolution, it appears as if the interviewees have no choice in this matter: the US appears to be asking for an institutional right to kidnap families. The US and UK would have the right to ask for people to be interviewed, and to have the results transmitted back to them. In theory, the US could under the terms of the draft resolution ask for Saddam Hussein to be interviewed outside of the country; if he fails to comply, Iraq will be in violation of the resolution. Much as we would like him to, we cannot reasonably expect Saddam Hussein to place his own head willingly on the chopping block. The US and UK will have the right to appoint any officials to the inspections teams, a particularly inapt demand given the record of the US in placing personnel within the previous weapons inspections body with the role of illicitly undermining the Iraqi government. These personnel would have full immunity inside Iraq, with the right to seize and destroy any property, and to visit any site of their choosing. Inspections teams would be accompanied by armed forces, and would be able to declare "no-drive" and exclusion zones in any place at will. The attempt to preserve a justification for war comes at high price. Instead of weapons inspectors inside Iraq, the sites at which Iraq - we are told - is developing non-conventional weapons would go unmonitored. If the US and UK do manage to bribe and cajole the other Security Council members into making demands that they know cannot be accepted, the dynamic towards war will be considerably harder to stop. |
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Author: Glen Rangwala Back to the Index of Writings |
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