A new policy for Iraq?

The proposals now finding favour with Bush and Blair won’t solve Iraq’s problems, argues Glen Rangwala

Published in Labour Left Briefing (December 2006)

They slaughtered goats to celebrate the resignation of US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in Ramadi, the town in western Iraq that has been the target of repeated but futile US assaults over the past three years. With Vice-President Cheney, himself now facing marginalisation, Rumsfeld was one half of the cabal – in the term pointedly used by Lawrence Wilkerson, Secretary of State Colin Powell’s chief of staff during and after the Iraq invasion – that devised the political strategy after September 2001 to begin the war on Iraq, and which took charge of policymaking on Iraq afterwards to disastrous effect. Rumsfeld steered the fabrication of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction, authorised extensive torture and kidnapping, and favoured the bombing of Iran in the belief that this would spark an internal revolt and eventual regime change.

The pleasure at Rumsfeld’s departure may be widespread outside the White House and Downing Street, but it shouldn’t distract from the fact that not only goats were being slaughtered in Iraq in the wake of the US mid-term elections. The toll compiled by the Iraqi government of those killed in political violence in October stood at 1,289. The real figure no doubt is much higher, but the relevant statistic is that this was almost 20 per cent higher than the previous month’s tally, compiled using the same methods, which itself was the highest civilian death count for any month since the invasion. Put simply, the war in Iraq is becoming significantly more murderous with every passing month, and it is worse now than ever. Mr Blair told the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in mid-November that the British strategy in Iraq was “succeeding”. That claim should have stuck in the throat of anyone aware that the war is escalating, not diminishing; sadly, such awareness seems to be too much to expect from the prime minister.

Blair’s speech was heavily trailed however not for his judgment of British success but for another argument that he was making: that there should be coordination with Syria and Iran in order to bring peace to Iraq. In fact, Blair did not say anything of the sort in his speech, but that was what the advance briefings about this speech and his confidential testimony the following day to a US official advisory panel – the Iraq Study Group (ISG) – were all about. This has become the latest big proposal in Washington, and is likely to be a major recommendation of the ISG when it issues its recommendations in December.

This might sound like a good idea to many, including critics – after all, it signals a turn to multilateral decision-making, something the Bush administration has until now avoided in the war and occupation of Iraq. It also implies a retreat from the strategy and language of regime change for Syria and Iran. Bush surprised many by nominating Robert Gates to be Donald Rumsfeld’s replacement to head the Pentagon, because Gates has been a critic of past policies on Iran. In 2004, he co-authored a substantial report that proposed a systematic change of track on Iran: the report acknowledged that military action against Iran would be counterproductive, that the regime in Tehran is there to stay, and that the US shares common interests with it that can be pursued. So the fact of his nomination indicates that Bush has abandoned – at least for now – the fantasy of toppling the Iranian theocracy on the cheap through a few bombing raids.

The lessened prospects for war with Iran are clearly good news. It’s far from clear though that there is anything in these proposals for the people of Iraq. Syria and Iran aren’t going to help out in Iraq out of a new desire to ease Blair and Bush out of the mess that they have created for themselves. Blair claimed that Iran could either be part of a “partnership” or face “isolation”, once again ignoring that Iran is already well integrated into its regional environment and that it is Britain, not Iran, facing international diplomatic isolation in the wake of the Iraq fiasco. Iran and Syria are only going to engage if they see the opportunity to build and strengthen their own petty fiefdoms in Iraq. They would do that in the manner that they have done so previously: by supporting the political factions that act as their proxies inside Iraq.

In a country already ruled by competing militia, this may sound like more of the same. In fact, it may be worse. This goes back to the reasons for the current sectarian violence in Iraq. Some, like the current US administration, portray this violence in terms of ancestral, irrational hatreds for which a large army is needed to repress. This claim is then used to justify the occupation and the propping up of the current government that, despite some tensions, still gives a free hand to US forces in Iraq. However, as most Iraqis will tell you, sectarian animosities have always been marginal to Iraqi life.

A more realistic perspective is that there are different well-armed groups in Iraq who espouse sectarian identities, but who are out for whatever political benefits they can achieve. What stops them compromising with each other is that they each think that they will soon be able to inflict a massive defeat on their opponents: the Shi’a groups who run central government think they can continue to draw on US support, or future Iranian support, and so see no need to rein in the militias and their own forces who kill Sunni Arabs. The Sunni Arab groups know that they have made the US presence in Iraq politically unbearable, and think that once the US has left, they will be able to topple the Shi’a-led government with some help from Syria. The very uncertainty over the international jockeying that is going on prevents Iraqi groups from coming to a compromise with each other.

Inviting Syria and Iran into a role in Iraq may help the US and UK to reduce the numbers of their troops in Iraq. It may even allow Bush once again to proclaim victory, and mission accomplished. But it will do little to bring the conflict within Iraq to an end. Iraqis need an end to foreign involvement in their politics, not its deepening. Even though that hyper-interventionist Donald Rumsfeld may have left office, his legacy then may only be furthered by his successors.

Author: Glen Rangwala

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