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The Myth that
all Iraq needs to do to lift sanctions is comply with weapons inspectors
In April 1991, at the end of the Gulf War
the United Nations Security Council linked the continuation on economic
sanctions on Iraq to its compliance with weapons inspectors and in disarmament.
Once Iraq had complied, "the prohibitions against the import of commodities
and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial
transactions .. shall have no further force or effect" (para.22
of Security
Council Resolution 687, 3 April 1991). However, there was a rub: the
determination that Iraq had complied was not to be made by an impartial
institution or body of independent experts, but by the Security Council
itself. Since the US and UK have a veto in the Security Council, either
one of these states could block any attempt to lift the sanctions, whatever
Iraq's stance towards the weapons inspectors.
From the end of the Gulf War, senior officials from the US in particular
have repeatedly indicated that they will ensure that sanctions are kept
in place regardless of weapons issues. Therefore, Iraq was deprived of
any incentive to comply with the UN weapons inspectors. These are some
of the statements made by the US and UK that have led Iraq to distrust
the Security Council's arms control measures, and the value in complying
with them.
- "My Government believes that it will in fact prove impossible for
Iraq to rejoin the community of civilized nations while Saddam Hussein
remains in power."
- David Hannay, the UK's permanent representative to UN, 3 April
1991, after voting for Security Council Resolution 687, to keep sanctions
on Iraq. Full text here,
p.37.
- "Do I think the answer is now for Saddam Hussein to be kicked out?
Absolutely because there will not be - may I finish, please? - there
will not be normalized relations with the United States, and I think
this is true for most coalition partners, until Saddam Hussein is out
of there. And we will continue the economic sanctions."
- President George H. Bush, 16 April 1991. White House Briefing.
Full text here.
- "Saddam is discredited and cannot be redeemed. His leadership will
never be accepted by the world community and, therefore, Iraqis will
pay the price while he remains in power. All possible sanctions will
be maintained until he is gone. Any easing of sanctions will be considered
only when there is a new government."
- Robert M. Gates, Deputy National Security Adviser, on 7 May
1991. Quoted in "U.S. Sanctions Threat Takes U.N. by Surprise",
Los Angeles Times (9 May 1991), emphasis added. The full text
of the article is here.
- "President Bush said today that the United States would oppose
the lifting of the worldwide ban against trading with Iraq until President
Saddam Hussein is forced out of power in Baghdad".
- "Bush Links End Of Trading Ban To Hussein Exit", The New York Times,
21 May 1991.
- "We do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies
with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions
should be lifted. Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove
its peaceful intentions. It can only do that by complying with all of
the Security Council resolutions to which it is subjected.
Is it possible to conceive of such a government under Saddam Hussein?
When I was a professor, I taught that you have to consider all possibilities.
As Secretary of State, I have to deal in the realm of reality and probability.
And the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein's intentions will
never be peaceful."
- Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, 26 March 1997. This
statement was made in her first major foreign policy address as Secretary
of State, at Georgetown University, USA. The official text is here.
- Q Just to follow up on John's question. Did the President
intend to kind of move the goalposts this morning when he said that
the sanctions will be kept in place as long as Saddam is in power, as
long as he lasts, as he put it? Is it his opinion that the sanctions
will not be lifted ever as long as Saddam is in power, whatever he does,
even if he were to comply?
MR. BERGER: Let Saddam Hussein come into compliance, and then
we can discuss whether there are any circumstances.
Q But, Sandy, for the record, can you say from this podium that
if he were --
MR. BERGER: It has been our position consistently that Saddam
Hussein has to comply with all of the relevant Security Council resolutions
for the sanctions.
Q But can you say for the record, that were he to comply -- I
know that the point is moot for you at this point, but were he to comply
with the sanctions, the U.S. would not block the U.N. from lifting the
sanctions?
MR. BERGER: I don't think under these circumstances, when he
is blatantly out of compliance it is the right time for us to talk about
how we lift the sanctions. We're not going to negotiate lifting the
sanctions at a time when he is in blatant disregard, not only of the
sanctions, but also of the Security Council resolutions.
Q It's not a matter of negotiating, it's a point that we're
asserting what is in the resolution. They said that if he complies --
that he has complied, the sanctions would be lifted. Is it the U.S.
position right now that they would be lifted, or would you oppose such
a move?
MR. BERGER: It has been the U.S. position since the Bush administration
that Saddam Hussein has to comply with all of the relevant Security
Council resolutions.
Q Not to belabor a quote, but what the President said is what
he has just done is to ensure that the sanctions will be there until
the end of time, or as long as he lasts.
MR. BERGER: Well, that's right. That's not inconsistent with
what I've said. In other words, there's no way --if he's got to be in
compliance, he can't be in compliance if he's thrown the UNSCOM people
out. So it's a necessary condition; it may not be a sufficient condition.
- National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, 14 November 1997. The
official text of the press conference is here.
- "As a second matter, strictly US policy, we believe that Iraq
would be better served with a different leadership with a different
regime so we have had a policy of regime change, which really has been
there all along but was crystallised by President Clinton in 1998 at
the time of Operation Desert Fox about that period, don't pin me down
exactly but that was when it really began to be firmly articulated and
became the policy of the US government.
It doesn't mean that an invasion is imminent. Sanctions and the pressure
of sanctions are part of a strategy of regime change, support for
the opposition, and reviewing additional options that might be available
of a unilateral or multilateral nature."
Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, 12 February 2002. Interview with
The Financial Times, here.
Emphasis added.
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