"The end of the road?" (28 August 2003)

Published in Palestine News (Autumn 2003)

The resumption of large-scale violence in Palestine is the result of a deliberate strategy to prevent a peaceful solution emerging, argues Glen Rangwala

Once again, the briefest of lulls in violence between Palestinians and Israelis – paraded this time as the implementation of the "Roadmap" – looks set to be extinguished by a further protracted round of atrocities. Few on either side had expected the Roadmap to progress beyond its first stage. Affirming its timetable had always been a matter of courtesy, a diplomatic nicety, rather than an expression of realistic expectation. That was because no one expected the government of Ariel Sharon to accept the existence of a viable Palestinian state, let alone a just solution to the conflict. It was only a matter of time before the excuse for abandoning the Roadmap could be found.

The primary structural flaw of the Roadmap was that a party to the conflict – the USA, which arms and finances Israel to fight a war against the Palestinians – monopolised the role of arbiter. The Roadmap was officially released under the auspices of the Quartet, which includes the EU, UN and Russia, but these bodies have agreed to defer to the US in its implementation. This hold-over from the Oslo process (1993-2001) has meant, and continues to mean, that the grievances of one side are placed at the centre of any negotiations, while the interests of the other are disregarded after initial expressions of support and are violated with impunity.

The Roadmap was premised on the notion that the problem that needs to be solved is Palestinian resistance to the occupation, not the occupation itself. After it was released on 30th April, even the most flagrant Israeli violations of its provisions, such as house demolitions and attacks on civilians – both of which it expressly prohibits, but which were Israel conducted within days of having nominally accepted the process – excited no international attention and no expressions of disapproval from the US.

Israel failed to move to implement the remaining provisions of relevance to Palestinian lives. On the key humanitarian issue of Palestinian freedom of movement within the Occupied Territories, the setbacks were as numerous as the advantages. When Israel took its remaining forces out of Bethlehem in June, the only Palestinian town from which there was a withdrawal, it established roadblocks on every route into and out of the town, creating siege-like conditions instead of a sense of progress. There were releases of Palestinian prisoners, but only around 4% of the 7,000 political prisoners held by Israel were set free.

The Roadmap is silent on two other themes that have central significance for many Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. First, the separation barrier, cutting through the western lands of the West Bank, enclosing Qalqilya and creating the sense of living in a detention camp more palpably than ever before, is not addressed. President Bush had called the barrier a "problem" when he stood alongside Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmud Abbas at the White House on 25th July; he backtracked when he met Ariel Sharon four days later at the same location.

Second, there are no obligations on Israel to stop its policy of assassinations. In effect, the Roadmap gives Israel a free hand to kill whomever it labels a "terrorist" and expects the Palestinian Authority to serve as its guard by protecting them from the reprisals. It was this option that the Israeli government sought to exploit when Likud's settler constituency started to mobilise against even the nominal acceptance of Roadmap.

The unilateral ceasefire of 29th June, laboriously negotiated between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Syrian-based leftist groups and Fatah's indigenous leadership, was not anticipated by the Israeli leadership, especially after their failed assassination attempt on Hamas's most senior political leader in Gaza, Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi. The more low-key provocations, including the plans to construct 22 new settlement units in Gaza and the raid on Askar refugee camp on 8th August to kill two Hamas activists, did not tip the hand of Hamas or Islamic Jihad, both of whom continued to affirm the ceasefire.

Instead, Israel went for a more high profile target: on 14th August, Israeli units assassinated Muhammad Sidr, an Islamic Jihad leader in Hebron. This action can only have been done in the knowledge that there would be a response. Five days later, a suicide bomber from Hebron detonated himself and blew up 20 Israelis in a West Jerusalem bus.

This was the point at which an international pressure should have been exercised most vigorously to prevent the escalating cycle of retaliations. Instead, President Bush telephoned Ariel Sharon to inform him of the "need to crack down on terrorists and terrorist infrastructure", according to the White House press spokesman. This was the green light to forget the Roadmap and to attack Palestinians at whim. The day after the call from the President, Ismail Abu Shanab, the contact person within Hamas for other Palestinian political groups and many international organisations, was assassinated and the Palestinian ceasefire was over. The 40,000 settlers who took to the streets of Jerusalem in June to demand an end to the Roadmap had their way once again.

Author: Glen Rangwala

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